„პუტინის შემდეგ: ალტერნატიული ძალის ცენტრები, ინტერესთა თანხვედრა და კონფლიქტი“

Putin’s Russia is directly associated with the so-called power-vertical (vertical vlasti) in which every
major political decision regarding structural changes is linked to the Kremlin, i.e., Putin and his
entourage. Nonetheless, as in every authoritarian system, personal loyalty does not preclude from
building informal alliances and shared interests between powerful actors, whether political or eco
nomic. As there is no way of changing the political regime in Russia democratically, and the only
remaining option is a coup d’état-like scenario, the key question remains – who will become Putin’s
successor, and consequently, which powerful actors will build alternative power centers rivaling for
political survival and ultimate political dominance in post-Putin Russia?
While focusing on the mentioned puzzle, the research project followed the logic of the sequence of
analytical steps. First, the snapshot of the current situation in Russia, i.e., a comprehensive analysis
of the socio-political and economic status quo was done, in which major sectors of Russia’s politi
co-economic fabric were reviewed and assessed. The sectoral dynamics review was followed by
an analysis of major actors, their relevance, and their interests in respective sectors. These included
both political actors (individuals and institutions) as well as oligarchs and regional elites, with their
respective sector-linked power, financial resources or personal ties. In the end, the hypothetical
scenario, in which Putin’s figure no longer exists and power-vertical becomes questionable, made it
possible to construct a number of prospective rivaling power-centers, in which personal, corporate,
political, and financial interests of powerful actors converge. These power-centers will inevitably try
to acquire political legitimacy, oligarchic resource base, and hard (military) power, to compete and
survive. All these findings are addressed by this research, sufficiently elaborated and presented for
further discussion.

Disclaimer:
This article was first published in Un cambio de época: América del Norte y la intervención rusa en Ucrania. Geopolítica y nuevas dinámicas de la globalización.

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving dilemma of European defence integration through the prism of the debate between “more EU in Europe” and “more EU in NATO.” It analyzes the structural, political, and strategic tensions shaping EU–NATO defence cooperation in the context of renewed great-power competition and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The study situates the discussion within broader debates on European strategic autonomy, transatlantic burden-sharing, and institutional duplication, assessing whether deeper EU defence integration strengthens or fragments the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. By exploring initiatives such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund, and the EU Strategic Compass alongside NATO’s force posture adaptation and enlargement dynamics, the paper evaluates the degree of complementarity and competition between the two organizations.

The analysis argues that the core challenge is not a binary institutional choice but the management of functional interdependence between the EU and NATO. While greater EU defence capabilities may enhance European resilience and contribute to fairer burden-sharing within NATO, misaligned political visions, capability gaps, and strategic divergences risk reinforcing fragmentation. The paper concludes that sustainable European security requires calibrated integration: strengthening EU defence instruments while anchoring them firmly within NATO’s collective defence framework. The future of Euro-Atlantic security will depend on whether policymakers can reconcile ambitions for European autonomy with the enduring strategic centrality of NATO.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the transformation in Sino-Georgian relations since 2012, highlighting how bilateral ties have evolved from limited economic engagement into a formal strategic partnership. It situates this evolution within China’s more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative and Georgia’s strategic recalibration under the Georgian Dream government. The study examines China’s motivations, including logistical access via the Middle Corridor, political diversification in the Black Sea region, and symbolic partnership with a cooperative democracy. It explores Georgia’s calculus in seeking alternative sources of investment, hedging against Western conditionality, and leveraging the relationship for domestic legitimacy. The article then assesses key risks: the asymmetry of power and unmet expectations, the tension between Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and deeper ties with China, the waning momentum of the BRI, and the fragility of a pragmatism-based partnership. In conclusion, it argues that without stronger institutional mechanisms and clearer strategic objectives, the Sino-Georgian partnership is likely to remain symbolic rather than transformative, offering cautionary lessons for small-state diplomacy in a multipolar world.