Author: Vasil Ghlonti, International Security Expert
On June 13, 2025, the Israeli Air Force targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, military installations, mansions of nuclear physicists, senior officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the General Staff, resulting in considerable turmoil and anxiety among the Iranian population. Considering Iran’s status as a highly multiethnic nation, where diverse ethnic groups significantly influence its political, economic, and social dynamics, the global community demonstrated notable interest in the reactions of Iran’s ethnic minorities during the 12-day war, as well as their attitudes and potential responses to the conflict.
The Attitudes of Iran’s Ethnic Minorities Regarding the War
Iran, a nation with a rich historical and imperial legacy, has consistently been home to diverse nationalities. Even now, the nation continues to exhibit a highly diverse and complex ethnic composition. Alongside Persians, recognized as the state-forming nation in Iran, there exist Iranian Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, Armenians, Jews, and members of other ethnic groups. Nonetheless, regarding participation in the nation’s political processes, specific emphasis is placed on the Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, and Baluchis.
During the early phase of the Israel-Iran conflict, a considerable segment of Iran’s populace, particularly in the Persian and Azerbaijani areas, perceived the war as a viable means to oust the Ayatollahs from authority and even endorsed the bombardments on the regime’s critical establishments. Nonetheless, they did not endorse the notion that the conflict personally impacted their families and regular individuals. The commencement of hostilities between Israel and Iran generated chaos and confusion within the Iranian populace, complicating the identification of societal sectors, including ethnic minorities, that retained an optimistic outlook vs. others that descended into pessimism. However, another trend became instantly apparent: as the bombings escalated, the likelihood of unification within Iran’s fragmented population against the United States and Israel increased, as corroborated by accounts filmed and disseminated by Western media.
Another significant element is that, despite Israel and the United States hitting specific facilities with high precision, there were instances of civilian fatalities, notably among Azerbaijani Turks. This scenario significantly disturbed Iran’s ethnic minority, particularly Iranian Azerbaijanis. This was particularly evident as, like numerous other regions and cities, the areas of Tabriz and Ardabil, inhabited by Azerbaijani Turks, were subjected to active bombardment. Israel and the United States launched significant attacks targeting military installations, along with key energy and nuclear infrastructure, in the cities of Urmia and Tabriz. The situation escalated to the extent that the official government of Baku intervened and urged Israel to desist from hitting Iranian regions populated by Azerbaijanis. Significantly, even dissenting and separatist media sites representing Iranian Azerbaijanis reported on this matter, highlighting its sensitivity and importance.
This reality alienated a substantial segment of Iran’s populace, especially Iranian Azerbaijanis, from Israel and the United States, essentially undermining the objective of potentially supplanting the Ayatollahs’ administration. Moreover, the fatalities of ordinary soldiers, many of whom are Iranian Azerbaijani Turks, also benefited the Ayatollahs. Behind each individual resided extensive families and broader family networks for whom this situation was wholly intolerable.
The comparatively subdued activity of Iranian Azerbaijanis against the regime might possibly be attributed to the following factor: Iranian Azerbaijanis are completely assimilated into Iran’s governmental framework. Furthermore, Iranian Azerbaijanis have numerous high-ranking posts throughout the country. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, hails from Iranian Azerbaijan, but the current president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is an Azerbaijani from Tabriz. Moreover, Iranian Azerbaijanis occupy numerous key positions within the government, intelligence agencies, and military institutions.
It is important to acknowledge the presence of several separatist organizations operating in Iranian Azerbaijan, including the following: – The National Liberation Front-Movement of South Azerbaijan – The Azerbaijani State Organization of Resistance – The Democratic Turkic Union of South Azerbaijan – The Azerbaijani Student Movement – The South Azerbaijan Independence Party – The Democratic Party of South Azerbaijan – The Liberal-Democratic Party of South Azerbaijan – The Central Party of Azerbaijan The National Awakening Movement of South Azerbaijan functions autonomously and prioritizes federal reorganization within Iran over the secession of Azerbaijani territories from the nation. Consequently, a specific segment of Iranian Azerbaijanis advocates for national rights and espouses separatist perspectives. Nonetheless, owing to the aforementioned constraints, such organizations have thus far abstained from issuing robust anti-regime declarations or launching aggressive movements against the state.
The aforementioned causes ultimately led to the absence of anti-regime rallies in Iranian Azerbaijan throughout the 12-day conflict. The Iranian Azerbaijanis monitored the Israel-Iran conflict with apprehension and vigilance, given its immediate implications for them.
In the context of the Iran-Israel war, significant focus is directed towards the circumstances in Iran’s Kurdish-populated areas, where the following organizations operate: Komala, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDPI), PJAK (the Iranian affiliate of the PKK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). Overall, despite the extreme positions of certain parties, Iranian Kurdish organizations have maintained a careful and measured approach since the onset of the war. This prompts the inquiry: Why are Iranian Kurds exhibiting such caution? It is likely that they were not entirely persuaded that the primary objective of the United States and Israel was to depose Iran’s existing regime, particularly considering that Washington altered its stance on this matter several times. During the war, the U.S. president indicated that regime change in Iran could be probable due to the intransigent position of the Ayatollahs. Subsequently, he rescinded this assertion, contending that such an occurrence would result in disorder.
Trump’s initial statement may have been deliberately intended to motivate Iran’s opposition and ethnic minorities to increase their activism. Nonetheless, an additional significant detail exists—due to Trump’s erratic stance, Iranian Kurds may have apprehended that if Israel and the U.S. concentrated exclusively on neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program and halted military operations post-destruction of the nuclear facilities, the Ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard would retain power and subsequently retaliate against the Kurdish parties and organizations that opposed them. This will inevitably result in severe punitive actions by Iranian security forces in the Kurdish regions of Iran, leading to significant casualties among the Kurdish populace. Ultimately, from today’s viewpoint, the prudence demonstrated by Kurdish organizations has been validated, as the Iranian government, albeit enduring a significant setback, has persisted and commenced retribution against its political adversaries and purported foreign operatives. In recent times, Iran’s intelligence agencies have conducted widespread repressions, detaining numerous civilians on charges of being Israeli agents.
A further element to consider is the prospective resurgence of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former Shah, who has recently been highly engaged in the public domain and has explicitly articulated his aspiration to regain power. During the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty, numerous Kurdish political leaders were apprehended or exterminated, severely undermining the Kurdish national movement in Iranian Kurdistan. Consequently, it is probable that for the Kurds, the possibility of a descendant of a grandfather and father notorious for punitive actions against them regaining power was utterly intolerable.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the prevailing restriction, specific exceptions emerged. On June 14, 2025, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) released a statement urging the populace to depose the Iranian government. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), basedin Iraqi Kurdistan, declared that one of its Kurdish factions was ready to combat with Israel. Recent statements indicate that the Iranian government has dispatched supplementary armed forces to the Eastern Kurdistan area of Iran. Additionally, Iranian intelligence agencies apprehended approximately 300 ethnic Kurds, with several facing execution. Iranian security forces likely anticipated an escalation of tensions in Kurdistan and implemented preventive measures, particularly given the significant influence of Israel and the United States over Kurdish parties and organizations, which were regarded as dependable allies and partners.
The leadership of PJAK, the Iranian affiliate of the now-defunct PKK, has proposed to the populace and political parties of Iranian Azerbaijan to enhance collaboration and achieve unity. According to the Kurdish party, amid the Iran-Israel conflict, maintaining peace and coordinating collective protection from Iranian intelligence services was crucial in the regions of Iranian Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijani and Kurdish populations live side by side. This specifically pertains to Urmia, the capital of Iran’s West Azerbaijan province, and its adjacent regions, which are classified as high-risk locations for future ethnic strife and are subject to heightened oversight by Iran’s security forces, even in times of calm. The Baluchistan Liberation Movement notably expressed support for Israel in response to the Israel-Iran war. The leadership of this organization identified Iran and Pakistan as adversaries of both Israel and Baluchistan. This group may have conducted minor activities against Iran, although such endeavors were unlikely to significantly affect the Israel-Iran conflict or the stability of the Ayatollahs’ administration. Notably, the Iran-Israel conflict raised significant concerns in Pakistan, primarily due to fears of renewed Baloch separatist activity along its border with Iran.
Conclusive Remarks
The Iran–Israel conflict plainly illustrated that the ethnic minorities residing in Iran, together with their associated parties and organizations, adopt a notably circumspect position on the Ayatollahs’ ruling government. This is probably influenced by the historical experiences they have amassed over the last decades. Nonetheless, due to the disparate situations experienced by various ethnic minorities, their sentiments also range. Due to the substantial presence of Iranian Azerbaijanis among the nation’s political, economic, and military elite, they do not display revolutionary inclinations. Among Iranian Azerbaijanis, two somewhat contradictory notions exist: 1. Complete integration into Iran’s governmental framework and acquisition of governance control—an objective that has mostly been achieved at this juncture; 2. The maintenance of Turkic-Azerbaijani national identity and prospective secession from Iran. Proponents of the second notion regard the probability of overthrowing Iran’s very stable regime as exceedingly low; in the present conditions, it seems implausible.
Conversely, the Kurds encounter an entirely distinct reality. Although of Iranian descent and ethnically connected to Persians, they have not been able to fully actualize their potential. Their rights in Iran are significantly constrained, and the governing system perceives many of them as separatists. Consequently, several Kurdish organizations advocate for armed conflict as a method of affirming their national identity and safeguarding their interests.
In conclusion, it may be asserted that most ethnic minorities are likely to endeavor to cohabit with the existing Iranian regime in a manner conducive to peaceful growth. Nevertheless, some factions among this minority, particularly certain Kurdish parties and organizations, may persist in isolated battles in the future. In the case of Iran’s Azerbaijani Turks, the likelihood of them spearheading revolutionary developments appears limited, particularly in light of the fact that individuals from their ethnic group already hold high-ranking political offices within the state. Conversely, the process of their incorporation into the state system is anticipated to progress.
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author