The Security, Policy & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN) represents a synthesis of expertise in security, policy, nationalism studies and research. Established with the vision of becoming a leading institution, UGSPN strives to provide a comprehensive and integrated approach to understanding, researching, and influencing policy in the realms of national security, defense, and nationalism studies.
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Putin’s Russia is directly associated with the so-called power-vertical (vertical vlasti) in which every
major political decision regarding structural changes is linked to the Kremlin, i.e., Putin and his
entourage. Nonetheless, as in every authoritarian system, personal loyalty does not preclude from
building informal alliances and shared interests between powerful actors, whether political or eco
nomic. As there is no way of changing the political regime in Russia democratically, and the only
remaining option is a coup d’état-like scenario, the key question remains – who will become Putin’s
successor, and consequently, which powerful actors will build alternative power centers rivaling for
political survival and ultimate political dominance in post-Putin Russia?
While focusing on the mentioned puzzle, the research project followed the logic of the sequence of
analytical steps. First, the snapshot of the current situation in Russia, i.e., a comprehensive analysis
of the socio-political and economic status quo was done, in which major sectors of Russia’s politi
co-economic fabric were reviewed and assessed. The sectoral dynamics review was followed by
an analysis of major actors, their relevance, and their interests in respective sectors. These included
both political actors (individuals and institutions) as well as oligarchs and regional elites, with their
respective sector-linked power, financial resources or personal ties. In the end, the hypothetical
scenario, in which Putin’s figure no longer exists and power-vertical becomes questionable, made it
possible to construct a number of prospective rivaling power-centers, in which personal, corporate,
political, and financial interests of powerful actors converge. These power-centers will inevitably try
to acquire political legitimacy, oligarchic resource base, and hard (military) power, to compete and
survive. All these findings are addressed by this research, sufficiently elaborated and presented for
further discussion.
Disclaimer:
This article was first published in Un cambio de época: América del Norte y la intervención rusa en Ucrania. Geopolítica y nuevas dinámicas de la globalización.
Abstract
This paper examines the evolving dilemma of European defence integration through the prism of institutional competition between the EU and NATO. It analyzes the structural, political, and strategic tensions shaping EU–NATO defence cooperation in the context of renewed great-power competition and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The study situates the discussion within broader debates on European strategic autonomy, transatlantic burden-sharing, and institutional duplication, assessing whether deeper EU defence integration strengthens or fragments the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. By exploring initiatives such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund, and the EU Strategic Compass alongside NATO’s force posture adaptation and enlargement dynamics, the paper evaluates the degree of complementarity and competition between the two organizations.
The analysis argues that the core challenge is not a binary institutional choice but the inherent impossibility of functional complementarity and interdependence. While greater EU defence capabilities may enhance European resilience and contribute to fairer burden-sharing within NATO, misaligned political visions, capability gaps, and fragmentation of national interests turns the EU in terms of defence capacity and mission execution into a inherently deficient structure . The paper concludes that sustainable European security requires strengthening EU defence instruments while anchoring them firmly within NATO’s collective defence framework (Europeanization of NATO).
Over the past two decades authoritarian governance has undergone a significant transformation driven by the expansion of digital technologies. This article examines the rise of digital authoritarianism as a distinct mode of rule in which surveillance systems, algorithmic content control, and information manipulation are embedded within the routine structures of governance. It argues that contemporary authoritarianism is not merely an updated version of earlier coercive regimes, but a qualitatively different and more resilient form of rule characterized by greater subtlety, precision, and durability.
The article traces the evolution of digital authoritarian practices from early internet regulation to their consolidation in the 2010s, situating the concept within ongoing definitional debates that contrast intention-based, promotion-based, informational, and practice-oriented approaches. It then analyzes the political logic of digital authoritarianism, focusing on how information control, compliance, and legitimacy are managed through digital means, before outlining the core pillars of digital authoritarian rule: surveillance, censorship, and disinformation. The final sections assess international responses and the diffusion of digital authoritarian practices across regime types, with particular attention to hybrid regimes and small democracies, including a case study of Georgia as an illustration of how digital control tools can emerge even in formally democratic contexts amid political polarization and democratic backsliding. The article concludes that digital authoritarianism poses a structural challenge to liberal governance that existing regulatory and normative frameworks remain poorly equipped to address.
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