“After Putin Decoding Alternative Power Clusters, Interest Alignment and Conflicts”

Author: Nata Koridze

Executive Summary

The Black Sea has become a critical strategic area for Europe, due to Russia’s war in Ukraine and mounting worries about European security, energy, and connectivity. Georgia, at the heart of the Black Sea–South Caucasus nexus, is a structurally important transit state along the Middle Corridor, linking Europe, the Caspian region, and Asia. However, Georgia’s credibility with the European Union, NATO, and the United States has been weakened by its political choices marked by authoritarian trends and tacit accommodation with Russia, despite its geographic and infrastructural assets.

Georgia faces two clear paths: it can function mainly as a transit corridor and risk marginalization and de facto integration into Russia’s sphere, or it can pursue full alignment with democratic, Western-oriented structures. The former path means authoritarian consolidation, political isolation on international scene and loss of strategic agency leading to the de-facto loss of sovereignty. The latter path requires political clarity, institutional rebuilding, reversal of authoritarian trends and proactive engagement with Euro-Atlantic partners. In return it offers long-term security, autonomy, and regional relevance. Allowing Georgia to fall under Russia’s influence would harm not only Georgia, but the West as well. For the West, it would mean the retreat of liberal democracy in the region, the loss of strategic influence in the South Caucasus, and the loss of credibility in the Black Sea region.

Putin’s Russia is directly associated with the so-called power-vertical (vertical vlasti) in which every
major political decision regarding structural changes is linked to the Kremlin, i.e., Putin and his
entourage. Nonetheless, as in every authoritarian system, personal loyalty does not preclude from
building informal alliances and shared interests between powerful actors, whether political or eco
nomic. As there is no way of changing the political regime in Russia democratically, and the only
remaining option is a coup d’état-like scenario, the key question remains – who will become Putin’s
successor, and consequently, which powerful actors will build alternative power centers rivaling for
political survival and ultimate political dominance in post-Putin Russia?
While focusing on the mentioned puzzle, the research project followed the logic of the sequence of
analytical steps. First, the snapshot of the current situation in Russia, i.e., a comprehensive analysis
of the socio-political and economic status quo was done, in which major sectors of Russia’s politi
co-economic fabric were reviewed and assessed. The sectoral dynamics review was followed by
an analysis of major actors, their relevance, and their interests in respective sectors. These included
both political actors (individuals and institutions) as well as oligarchs and regional elites, with their
respective sector-linked power, financial resources or personal ties. In the end, the hypothetical
scenario, in which Putin’s figure no longer exists and power-vertical becomes questionable, made it
possible to construct a number of prospective rivaling power-centers, in which personal, corporate,
political, and financial interests of powerful actors converge. These power-centers will inevitably try
to acquire political legitimacy, oligarchic resource base, and hard (military) power, to compete and
survive. All these findings are addressed by this research, sufficiently elaborated and presented for
further discussion.

Disclaimer:
This article was first published in Un cambio de época: América del Norte y la intervención rusa en Ucrania. Geopolítica y nuevas dinámicas de la globalización.

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving dilemma of European defence integration through the prism of institutional competition between the EU and NATO. It analyzes the structural, political, and strategic tensions shaping EU–NATO defence cooperation in the context of renewed great-power competition and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The study situates the discussion within broader debates on European strategic autonomy, transatlantic burden-sharing, and institutional duplication, assessing whether deeper EU defence integration strengthens or fragments the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. By exploring initiatives such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund, and the EU Strategic Compass alongside NATO’s force posture adaptation and enlargement dynamics, the paper evaluates the degree of complementarity and competition between the two organizations.

The analysis argues that the core challenge is not a binary institutional choice but the inherent impossibility of functional complementarity and interdependence. While greater EU defence capabilities may enhance European resilience and contribute to fairer burden-sharing within NATO, misaligned political visions, capability gaps, and fragmentation of national interests turns the EU in terms of defence capacity and mission execution into a inherently deficient structure . The paper concludes that sustainable European security requires strengthening EU defence instruments while anchoring them firmly within NATO’s collective defence framework (Europeanization of NATO).