Author: Vazha Sopromadze, UGSPN Administrative Head
Why is it important to know what is happening in Venezuela?
After Maduro’s abduction, attention toward Venezuela has significantly decreased, although important political processes are still taking place in the country. In recent months, Washington officially recognized Venezuela’s new government and, for the first time since 2019, resumed the functioning of the U.S. embassy in Caracas. In addition, interim President Rodriguez fired Defense Minister Vladimir Lopez, who was one of the main figures of the military wing of Maduro’s regime. A few days later, the White House removed interim President Rodriguez from the sanctions list. It is worth noting that sanctions were imposed on her during Trump’s first presidential term.
The change in the White House’s strategy toward Venezuela during Trump’s second presidential term is one of the clearest examples of the United States’ renewed foreign policy approach. Therefore, it is important to see how successful the White House’s strategy toward Caracas will be, because this affects U.S. foreign policy across the entire Western Hemisphere.
As we noted in a previous analytical article, during Trump’s second presidential term the White House’s strategy toward Venezuela changed significantly. Over the past year, Washington steadily tightened both its sanctions policy and its military-political tools of pressure on Maduro’s regime. At the beginning of January, by order of President Donald Trump, U.S. special forces carried out an operation to detain Nicolas Maduro. According to unofficial information, 100 people died during the operation. It should be noted that the American side had no fatalities. According to the Pentagon, 7 American soldiers were wounded. After the operation was completed, Maduro and his wife were taken to New York, where the U.S. federal prosecutor brought charges against them. The content of the charges itself deserves special attention, the American justice system accuses Maduro of narco-terrorism and related illegal activities. At the pretrial hearing, Maduro pleaded not guilty, while his defense team said that Maduro’s “abduction by military means” was illegal. The charges brought against Maduro should not be seen as an isolated legal event. A few months before Maduro’s arrest, Washington had declared drug cartels linked to the regime to be terrorist organizations. Therefore, the charges brought against Maduro suggest that both his detention and the creation of the legal framework for it were part of a prepared multi-stage strategy.
After Maduro’s detention, according to the constitution, the Supreme Court approved Vice President Delcy Rodriguez as acting president. Majority of experts working on the region agreed that under Maduro’s rule, a highly personalized authoritarian system had formed in Venezuela and there was an expectations that the disappearance of the “Maduro factor” would lead to regime destabilization, internal clan conflict, and fragmentation of power. However, events developed differently. Maduro’s physical removal did not lead to destabilization of the system, power remained under the regime’s control, and the vertical structure of rule did not significantly change. Moreover, alongside the process of formal legitimation, Rodriguez received support from the heads of the security and law enforcement structures. This creates serious suspicion that the operation planned by Washington may have been supported from inside the regime, directly or indirectly. This suspicion is further strengthened by the White House’s distant attitude toward opposition leaders in exile, some of whom President Trump had recognized as the legitimate authority of Venezuela during his first presidential term. This is exactly where the approach of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio becomes visible, according to which the White House prefers the model of so-called “managed stability.” Representatives of Venezuela’s current regime are forced to take Washington’s main demands into account, while in return they keep domestic political control. In this context, President Trump’s statements that after Maduro’s detention he “runs” Venezuela were especially symbolic.
It is also important that Maduro’s regime was left practically without the support of its allies. A few weeks before Maduro’s arrest, Caracas asked Russia, Iran, and China for military-technical assistance. However, none of them took real action. Both Russia and China limited themselves to diplomatic protests and statements of concern. At a critical moment, the regime failed to receive real support from its strategic partners.
The New President of the Old System
As already mentioned, Venezuela’s political system still rests on Maduro’s legacy. This concerns not only President Rodriguez herself, but also key figures who were central figures in the state apparatus under Maduro’s regime and bear responsibility, among other things, for the mass repression carried out after the 2024 elections. At this stage, Rodriguez is trying to use a strategy of controlled de-escalation, which is expressed in tactical concessions by the regime. According to available data, as a result of U.S. pressure, Rodriguez’s government released more than 3,000 political prisoners. At the same time, parliament is discussing a large amnesty bill that also provides for the release of some opposition leaders and civil activists from prison.
Also noteworthy is a Rodriguez’s initiative under which the infamous prison “El Helicoide,” which for many years was associated with political prisoners and repression, is to be turned into a sports and cultural center. This initiative was sharply criticized by human rights organizations. In their view, this is an attempt to rewrite the history of repression instead of having the regime admit the crimes committed against its own citizens. Despite Rodriguez’s dismissal of the defense minister, the ruling regime in Venezuela remains strong, and the key figures involved in the creation and preservation of authoritarian rule still keep important systemic influence.
The Opposition’s Dilemma
For years, different American administrations and the European Union viewed the opposition as the country’s legitimate political representative, but after Maduro’s abduction real power remained in the hands of regime representatives. At first, there was an expectation that Washington would actively involve the opposition spectrum in exile in the process. In this context, special attention was given to Maria Machado – the leader of the Venezuelan opposition and the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. However, the White House’s current strategy practically does not include active political support for the opposition. According to various sources, this approach is based, among other things, on the assessments of U.S. intelligence services which sees the opposition as too fragmented, believes that it does not have broad public support, and sees the lack of support from the security structures as especially problematic.
For the opposition, the most realistic path remains participation in the so-called “managed transition,” although it should be noted that there is no clear picture of how the transition process will develop. At the same time, there is also no agreement within the opposition about what strategy should be used to take part in the process. A clear difference of opinion can be seen between opposition forces remaining inside the country and influential members of the diaspora abroad. The more pragmatic wing believes that at this stage an acceptable result would be a broad amnesty, the return of leaders in exile, and the gradual softening of the repressive system. In contrast, the more radical wing argues that unless the current authoritarian system is fully dismantled, the so-called transition period will only bring a new form of continuation of the old elites’ power. In Maria Machado’s view, the end of the “Maduro regime” is inevitable, but it will be a difficult and long process in which both U.S. pressure and internal systemic reforms will be decisive. Otherwise, there remains a real risk of the opposition’s marginalization and radicalization, including of those forces that had previously been supported by the U.S. and the EU. At the same time, there are assessments that the Trump administration found Maria Machado’s position unacceptable, according to which elections in Venezuela should be held within one year. Such demands, it seems, do not fit into the White House’s agenda and may be seen as a risk of unwanted escalation.
At the beginning of April, Machado met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. According to reports in the media, the main topic of the meeting was Venezuela’s democratization process and the options for the opposition to be involved in it. After the meeting with Rubio, Machado said in an interview with Reuters that she plans to return to Venezuela by the end of the current year. She also said that if elections are not scheduled in the near future, the likelihood of civil conflict will grow even more.
At this stage, there is an expectation that the positions of the White House and the leader of Venezuela’s opposition will become closer, and it will become clearer in what form the White House plans to support the process of democratic change in Venezuela and the involvement of the broad opposition spectrum in the country’s ongoing political processes.
Economic Context
On February 10, 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a general license based on which oil and gas production in Venezuela became possible for US companies. According to the same document, any transaction in the relevant sector with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba is prohibited. As a result, American companies were given the opportunity to take part in Venezuela’s energy sector both in exploration and production. At the same time additional financial mechanism was created, through which the main transactions, including the movement of revenues and taxes, must be carried out. The United States is strengthening mechanisms of external financial control, which indirectly suggests that for Washington at this stage it is much more important to establish economic control over Venezuela than to ensure a healthy domestic political environment and a full democratic transition. In the conditions of growing demand for energy resources caused by the war against Iran, the United States is trying to ensure secure control over strategically important economic resources, while the issue of political democratization remains a secondary task.
The Main Components of the U.S. Strategy and Expectations
After Maduro’s removal, several main components can be identified in the White House’s strategy:
The first component – instrumentalizations of interim President Rodriguez as a tool of domestic political stability. Through her, Washington is trying to prevent the collapse of the regime and a power vacuum that could drag the country into chaos.
The second component – establishment of external control over the oil sector. Control of the energy sector is a matter of broad geopolitical importance for the United States.
The third component – limited and tightly controlled entry of the opposition into the political process. Within this model, the opposition is not seen as a real alternative for the immediate transfer of power, and it is still unclear in what form and within what timeframe the transformation of the political system will take place.
The complexity of the initial situation must also be considered. There is a high probability that the White House’s original calculations included the full dismantling of Maduro’s regime. However, the development of such a scenario would very likely have led to large-scale violence and civil conflict. Most likely, Washington had enough information about both the real strength of the regime’s repressive system and the fragmentation of the opposition and the real moods of society. Taking this into account, the strategy chosen by the White House turned out to be much more beneficial in the short term. Under this strategy, the United States is trying to gain maximum benefit without the rapid democratization of Venezuela’s political system.
For this reason, we can assume that the White House will continue a more effective and less risky long-term approach, under which the lifting of sanctions and other restrictions imposed on the regime will be directly tied to specific reforms and real concessions by the regime, which above all should be reflected in real political pluralism. However, the main question remains unanswered: can such “managed stability” turn into a real democratic transition, or will it ultimately only help preserve the authoritarian system in a new form?
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author.