Author: Giorgi Bilanishvili, Senior Fellow at UGSPN
Ukraine’s recent successful military operations have generated the perception that the dynamic of the Russia-Ukraine war is shifting in Ukraine’s favor. This perception is well-founded, yet circumstances indicate that both Ukraine and Russia face complex challenges. In articles published on this topic, analysts and researchers emphasize military and economic aspects that appear advantageous to Ukraine; however, their overall assessments remain cautious and measured.
Renowned historian and journalist Anne Applebaum, in an article published in The Atlantic, underscores Ukraine’s rapid technological progress in the defense sector and notes that its significance is increasingly recognized in Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and even within Russia itself. In her view, this makes clear that the Russian narrative is flawed: Ukraine is not losing the war, Russia is not winning, and even does not know how it might achieve victory. Applebaum argues that the current situation, even in the absence of negotiations, is leading the parties toward a new status quo, whereby a demilitarized zone could emerge between Ukraine and Russia, similar to that between North and South Korea. Senior Research Fellow for Applied Military Sciences at RUSI, Jack Watling in his article in Foreign Affairs highlights recent reforms within Ukraine’s defense forces, which have resolved previously existing problems and significantly increased effectiveness. At the same time, he discusses the difficulties and challenges confronting Russia’s armed forces. Nevertheless, Watling does not consider Ukraine’s military victory inevitable. He believes that Ukraine and its partners should use the current situation to reach an agreement with Russia on a ceasefire. Michael Froman, President of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), in his article focuses on the problems and challenges within Russia’s economy, while also reviewing those present in Ukraine’s economy. Ultimately, Froman regards the establishment of peace as the best possible outcome.
Against the backdrop of intensified debate in the West regarding the prospects of the Russia-Ukraine war, attention was drawn to an article published in the highly influential Russian journal – “Russia in Global Affairs”, authored by Vassily Kashin. At the outset, Kashin asserts that ending the war on the basis of an agreement reached between Putin and Trump in Anchorage would be the best of all possible scenarios. He later elaborates, stating that within the framework of the “Anchorage Agreement,” the allocation of territories to Russia[1], combined with prohibiting Ukraine from joining military blocs or hosting foreign military contingents, would constitute a favorable outcome and a full-fledged victory in the war for Russia. He then cites various facts and arguments to demonstrate that Russia cannot achieve better result through any form of escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons, since escalation would merely halt combat operations along the existing front line – an outcome which, in Kashin’s view, could be achieved today without any escalation.
The reality is indeed such that the war in Ukraine, which has already surpassed both the Second and First World Wars in duration, should compel the parties toward a ceasefire. Yet Russia’s position, and that of Putin personally, excludes the adoption of such a decision in the near future. On the contrary, recent developments reveal a certain escalation, manifested primarily in Russia’s strikes on Kyiv and Ukraine’s strikes on Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Russia’s and Ukraine’s Positions on a Ceasefire
Representatives of the Russian government periodically speak of a ceasefire and a peace agreement, but only with the stipulation that Ukraine must cede to Russia the non-occupied part of Donetsk. Most recently, Putin himself addressed this issue during a meeting with international media representatives at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. On this subject, Russian officials typically invoke the so-called “Anchorage Agreement,” which, according to their interpretation, envisages Ukraine’s concession of the aforementioned non-occupied part of Donetsk. However, it must be noted that President Trump has unequivocally denied the existence of such an agreement. Moscow’s conditions for ending military aggression against Ukraine are further confirmed by leaked materials from open sources concerning the preparation of propaganda messages by the Russian presidential administration. These materials indicate that any peace agreement with Ukraine must be presented as Moscow’s victory. According to the same documents, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are considered entirely under Russian ownership.
Ukraine, for its part, is prepared to agree to a ceasefire, but only on the condition that the status quo along the current front line is formally recognized. President Zelensky himself confirmed this position recently during an informal meeting with Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, which concerned a possible peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Specifically, Zelensky made it clear to Abramovich that Ukraine does not intend to cede Donetsk, and that the greatest compromise it is willing to make would be agreement to a ceasefire itself. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities are fully aware that support for a ceasefire agreement is growing both within the international community and inside Russia. Yet Putin’s personal uncompromising stance remains the greatest obstacle to such an agreement. Consequently, the Ukrainian side seeks to increase pressure directly on Putin. President Zelensky’s open letter addressed to Putin served this purpose. In this letter, numerous facts and assessments were presented that portrayed Putin in a negative light and, in some cases, diminished his stature. Nevertheless, the principal message of the letter emphasized that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and peace negotiations, which are not taking place solely because of Putin’s rejection.
Accordingly, in the current situation Ukraine is attempting to raise the “cost” of the war for Russia. By doing so, it aims to intensify pressure on Putin so that he agrees to a ceasefire without imposing additional demands. Ukraine’s military strategy is directed precisely toward this objective.
Ukraine’s Military Strategy
Technological progress has enabled Ukraine to wage war against Russia more effectively not only along the front line but also by inflicting greater damage on the adversary through strikes on occupied territories and deep within Russia. For example, the number of medium-range strikes on logistics in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories has increased significantly. In March alone, 288 such strikes were carried out – two and a half times higher than the previously recorded maximum. Recently, drone attacks on Crimea have become particularly intensive. In these cases, the primary targets are not military or other infrastructure, but rather supply lines from Russia to Crimea, which pass through Russian-occupied territories in southern Ukraine and across the Kerch Strait. As a result, shortages of petroleum products and various essential goods have emerged in Crimea.
At the same time, Ukraine has increased both the frequency and effectiveness of strikes deep within Russian territory, primarily targeting oil infrastructure and military facilities. Between 2022 and 2024, the number of strikes conducted at least 100 kilometers inside Russian territory totaled only 335. In 2025, this number rose to 658, and this year it is expected to exceed 800. The effectiveness of these strikes is so considerable that even the center of Moscow is no longer secure from Ukrainian attacks. Through such actions, Ukraine seeks to provoke discontent among the Russian population toward their own government, create additional economic problems for Russia, and damage its military production capacity, thereby reducing Russia’s war waging capability.
On the front line, Ukraine’s strategy is to inflict the highest possible losses on enemy personnel. In recent months, Russia has been losing on average 30,000-35,000 soldiers per month, killed or wounded. This figure exceeds the number of recruits Russia is able to mobilize, which amounts to approximately 800 contractors per day. Moreover, compared to the same period last year, recruitment in Russia decreased by 20% in the first quarter of this year. This situation has had a tangible impact on the battlefield, where in the spring Russia lost more territory than it gained. Specifically, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), between December 2025 and May 2026 Russia gained control or infiltrated 40.64 square kilometers, while losing 282.1 square kilometers of territory.
Despite the successful operations of Ukraine’s armed forces, Russian offensive activity continues to develop in the direction of Kramatorsk, which, together with Sloviansk, constitutes Ukraine’s principal military stronghold in Donetsk region. In addition, Russia exploits its advantage in ballistic weaponry, increasing the number of missile strikes against Ukraine. In 2025, Russia carried out approximately 600 such strikes, while this year it has already conducted 410. If this pace is maintained, the number of ballistic missiles strikes on Ukraine will reach approximately 900 by end of this year.
Economic Problems in Russia
At the end of January 2026, economist Vladimir Milov published an article in which he argued that this year would be the most difficult since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, as Russia would simultaneously face recession, inflation, and a budgetary crisis. Developments in Russia’s economy confirm that all three phenomena are indeed present.
According to official data, inflation in Russia is only 6%; however, its real level is likely to be in double digits. Based on figures from the first quarter of 2026, Russia’s economy contracted for the first time since 2023. Specifically, gross domestic product (GDP) was 0.2% lower compared to the same period of the previous year. Against this backdrop of worsening results, the Ministry of Economic Development reduced its forecast for economic growth in 2026 from 1.3% to 0.4%.
Russia’s budget deficit in January and February exceeded the projected level by more than 90%. In total, during the first three months of the year, the budget deficit reached 5.9 trillion rubles, whereas the forecast for the entire year of 2026 had been set at 3.8 trillion rubles.
Problems are evident in other sectors as well. For example, according to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, investment in Russia has declined. The liquid assets of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, which at the beginning of the war amounted to 6.5% of GDP, had fallen to 1.8% by April 2026.
The deteriorating economic situation affects virtually all sectors apart from the military. Russia’s military expenditures in 2025 reached 190 billion USD. Despite the deepening economic problems, military spending continues to rise at an unprecedented pace. In the first quarter of 2026, military expenditures amounted to 5.9 trillion rubles (81.8 billion USD), which is 30% higher than in the same period of the previous year. According to representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Russia, the costs of the war against Ukraine are gradually creating increasingly serious problems and carry the risk of pushing the budget deficit to a dangerous threshold. It should also be noted that, against the backdrop of the U.S.-Iran agreement, oil prices have already begun to decline, further worsening the outlook for Russia’s budgetary revenues.
Conclusion
Russia is increasingly compelled to pay a higher price for the war against Ukraine, both militarily and economically. Against this backdrop, even among well-known figures who support the regime or are generally loyal to it, instances of publicly expressed dissatisfaction have become more frequent. According to Alexander Baunov, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, three interrelated processes are unfolding in Russia: attitudes toward Putin are changing, optimism regarding the economy is disappearing, and there is a growing recognition that victory in the war against Ukraine is unattainable.
Nevertheless, at present there are no indications that Moscow will agree to a ceasefire without resolving the Donbas issue in its favor. Kyiv, for its part, does not intend to cede the non-occupied territories of Donetsk region in exchange for a ceasefire. Consequently, in the near future, further escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war is to be expected. The principal objective of this escalation, for both sides, is to achieve a ceasefire agreement under conditions acceptable to them.
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author.
[1] Kashin presumably implies non-occupied part of Donetsk region thus reflecting a position of Russia’s government.