Eka Javakhishvili, International Security Expert
Over the past five years, the developments in the South Caucasus have significantly weakened Russia’s traditional influence in the region. Following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Armenia experienced acute disappointment in Russia as a security guarantor and strategic partner. September 2023 turned out to be a turning point when Russian peacekeepers did not intervene in the military operation of Azerbaijan, which ended with the liquidation of the Karabakh enclave. After that, Russia gradually lost its role as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the spring of 2024, the Russian peacekeepers left the region ahead of schedule, which was a clear sign that the Kremlin had lost control of the situation. Peace talks between the conflicting parties continued without Moscow’s involvement and culminated in a historic peace agreement signed in Washington, putting an end to Russia’s ambition to play the role of the main mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, it should be noted that Russia has been waging a large-scale war against Ukraine for more than three years and is under the pressure of severe Western sanctions, which has given Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia, a chance to minimize Russia’s influence on both domestic and foreign policy interests.
Over the past few years, the Armenian government has increasingly expressed its desire to move closer to Western structures, which creates a clear picture of the country’s distancing itself from the orbit of Russian influence. Yerevan has made significant progress in forging close partnerships with the United States and the European Union. Nikol Pashinyan’s government aims to shift the country on a pro-Western political course, but the question is to what extent it will be able to get rid of the political, economic, and institutional influences established by Russia in the country over the decades. It is worth noting that the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026 in Armenia may turn out to be decisive in determining the country’s geopolitical course.
Post-Karabakh aftermath and the dynamics of Armenia-US relations
Back in 2023, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had denounced the “strategic mistake” Armenia had made in depending on just one partner in security matters. As he said, Armenia has already tasted the “bitter fruit” of such a strategic mistake and is currently trying to diversify its security strategy. On January 14, 2025, when Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed a Charter of Strategic Partnership between the two countries, the prospect of changing the balance of power in the region became clear.
The most important achievement of the recent period, which brings the cooperation between Armenia and the USA to a new stage, is the peace agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 at the White House with the mediation of the United States. With the joint peace declaration, the parties undertake to permanently cease hostilities and start trade, diplomatic relations, travel, and respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, the United States has signed bilateral agreements with each country in various spheres. The agreement also grants the United States exclusive rights to develop a strategic transit corridor in the South Caucasus, which was called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).Transferring the function of development and management of the disputed Zangezur/Syunik Corridor to the American side is a key point of the agreement, as the road, which runs through the sovereign territory of Armenia and connects Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan, has long been a source of disagreement and has hindered the achievement of a peace agreement. It is noteworthy that the “Trump Route” plan is based on the participation of American business as a stabilizing force in the conflict zone, which is very similar to the recent agreement on rare metals in Ukraine.
As the Armenian Prime Minister stated, with the signing of the peace declaration, a stage of peace, prosperity, security, and economic cooperation begins in the South Caucasus. If lasting peace is achieved and regional communications are effectively opened with U.S. involvement, Russia stands to lose even more influence in the Caucasus. Granting control of the Zangezur/Syunik corridor to an American company has raised concerns in neighboring Iran, as the development may alter the strategic balance in the South Caucasus and potentially generate new areas of tension. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has already warned the Armenian Prime Minister about possible actions by the American side, which, according to him, may pursue hegemonic goals in the Caucasus region under the cover of economic investments and the claim of ensuring peace. However, Pashinyan believes that the initiation of the “Trump Route” will benefit both Russia and Iran.
Armenia’s pivot to the European Union
Armenia’s cooperation with the European Union dates back many years. This relationship is grounded in the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,” which was signed in 1996 and entered into force in 1999. Since 2004, Armenia has been a member of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In 2009, the EU launched the “Eastern Partnership” program within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. Yerevan and Brussels discussed an association agreement, but after Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, under pressure from Moscow, an association agreement became impossible to reach. In 2017, Brussels and Yerevan signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which entered into force in 2021. Notably, in the post-Karabakh war period, the Armenian government has made considerable progress in its rapprochement with the European Union. According to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the country’s strategic objective is to join the European Union. Since autumn 2023, the European Union’s monitoring mission in Armenia (EUMA) has been operating in Armenia. In 2024, Armenia and the EU launched a dialogue on a visa-free regime. And on March 25, 2025, the Armenian parliament adopted a law on the initiation of the process of accession of Armenia to the EU. On June 30, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated that the EU and Armenia have never been closer than they are today.
The statements made during Kaja Kallas’ visit effectively summarize the current stage of relations between Yerevan and Brussels, as well as the trajectory of their ongoing development. Kallas emphasized the achievements of Armenia’s recent reforms and affirmed that the European Union is ready to enhance cooperation with Armenia in multiple domains, notably in the economic and security sectors. She spoke about Armenia’s “Resilience and Growth Plan”, according to which the European Union has allocated 270 million euros to Armenia for 2024-2027 to support business and reforms. As stated by Kallas, relations with Armenia extend beyond the economic sphere and encompass a dialogue on visa liberalization, for which the Commission has already approved an action plan. She also spoke about financial, psychosocial support and housing for internally displaced people from Karabakh. Kallas noted that the parties signed an agreement on crisis management, which allows Armenia to participate in EU missions in various parts of the world. In turn, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that Armenia and the EU have launched consultations on cooperation in the security and defense sectors. As he noted, Armenia is actively diversifying its security partnerships, and the EU monitoring mission is an important factor in stabilizing the region.
Following Kaja Kallas’ visit, on July 14, the Armenian Prime Minister met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa in Brussels, where they reaffirmed their support and readiness to develop a mutual partnership. They noted with satisfaction the progress in the visa liberalization process and Armenia’s recent law “On the Launch of the Process of European Integration”. The press release issued after the meeting notes that the EU reaffirmed its support for Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative to promote regional connectivity and reconciliation. It also highlights Armenia’s efforts in the peace talks with Azerbaijan and steps towards the normalization of relations with Türkiye. The leaders also underlined the importance of the possibility of including Armenia in the European Union’s regional and economic initiatives, particularly within the framework of the Black Sea Strategy. The parties hope that within the framework of the Global Gateway strategy, the volume of investments in Armenia will reach 2.5 billion euros, and within the framework of the Sustainability and Growth plan, the 270 million euros allocated to Armenia in 2024 will increase by 50%. During the meeting, the parties also discussed cooperation in the field of security, including information manipulation from abroad, disinformation, and cybersecurity. To support Armenia’s information ecosystem, the EU announced a 1.5-million-euro envelope to strengthen independent media.
The Crisis in Armenia-Russia Relations
Although the Armenian government is seeking to deepen its partnership with the West, Yerevan is simultaneously trying to maintain balanced relations with Russia. This comes as no surprise, given Armenia’s economic and energy dependence on Russia, which retains significant leverage over the country. As Pashinyan states, Armenia-Russian relations are in a transformation phase – they will no longer be the same as they were before, although this does not mean that relations should be bad. According to him, Yerevan will try to maintain friendly relations with Russia based on mutual respect. Pashinyan explained that Yerevan is interested in continuing to work in the “Eurasian Economic Union,” while it is closer to withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) than to restoring its membership. (In 2024, Armenia froze its membership in the CSTO, dissatisfied with the organization’s inaction during the Armenia-Azerbaijani war.) The Russian officials reminded Yerevan that EU membership is incompatible with membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. This means that Armenia will no longer trade with members of the Eurasian Economic Union without customs duties, which will significantly harm the country’s economy. As explained by the Armenian Foreign Ministry, the recently adopted bill initiating the process of Armenia’s alignment with the EU reflects a balanced foreign policy and does not, in itself, signify a formal application for EU membership.
Amid growing estrangement between Armenia and Russia, Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff to Vladimir Putin, was appointed on April 30 as the Kremlin’s “curator” of relations with Armenia. According to Russian media, the appointment reflects Moscow’s concern over Armenia’s “pivot to the West”, considered unacceptable by Russia. Kiriyenko is generally assigned to regions where Russia aims to consolidate political influence amid crises, as evidenced by his assignments in the occupied territories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. In 2022, Kiriyenko oversaw the occupied territories of Ukraine – the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics – and was tasked with ensuring their integration with Russia (he replaced Dmitry Kozak, the deputy chief of staff of the Russian presidential administration, as curator). In early 2025, he was entrusted with the curatorship of occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region of Georgia, as well as Moldova. Notably, in occupied Abkhazia, he initially appeared as curator during the so-called “presidential election campaign” to endorse Moscow’s preferred candidate. Many observers suggest that Kiriyenko’s mandate in Armenia involves organizing a political force aligned with Kremlin preferences for the parliamentary elections in June 2026, as well as defending Russia’s interests in Armenia using “soft power.” Since Pashinyan proved to be a politically inconvenient figure for the Kremlin, the question of removing him from power has actively appeared on Moscow’s agenda. In recent years, Russian TV channels have carried out coordinated and targeted propaganda campaigns against the Armenian government and Pashinyan personally, though so far these efforts have not achieved the desired effect.
Domestic Unrest and Moscow-Aligned Religious Opposition
It is noteworthy that Pashinyan’s pro-Western political course is strongly criticized by the Armenian Apostolic Church, headed by the Catholicos of All Armenians, Karekin II. The recent confrontation between the internal political and religious institutions clearly has a geopolitical dimension, closely linked to structures of Russian influence. It should be emphasized that the brother of Catholicos Karekin II heads the Apostolic Diocese of Armenia in Russia, which further strengthens suspicions about the possible presence of Moscow’s interests in the church. The disagreement between Pashinyan and Karekin II began back in 2020, when, after the defeat in the Karabakh war, the Catholicos demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister. Recently, their relationship has become highly tense: the Prime Minister accused Karekin II of supporting a coup d’état and of violating his vow of celibacy by fathering a child, calling on him to resign. The government also has a conflict with the archbishops, one of whom, Bagrat Galstanian was the organizer of the noisy anti-government protests of 2024 and became one of the main leaders of the opposition. At the end of June 2025, 17 people were arrested in Armenia in a criminal case of “attempted seizure of power”, in which Bagrat Galstanyan also participated. He is accused of preparing terrorism, inciting mass unrest, and attempting to seize power, and Archbishop Mikheil Ajapakhyan – of publicly calling for a violent change in the state structure. Both are being held in pre-trial detention for two months. The arrests were preceded by the dissemination of information in the media, which named individuals allegedly connected with the coup plot, including former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. According to the media, the resources of businessmen were also used to prepare the coup, including a Russian billionaire of Armenian origin, Samvel Karapetyan. Currently, Karapetyan is among those arrested, accused of “publicly calling for the usurpation of power or the violent overthrow of the constitutional order.” The alleged plot against the government and the subsequent arrests can be viewed as part of an intensification of the internal power struggle ahead of the 2026 elections. Some Armenian experts suggest that Karapetyan may have been a political rival to Pashinyan, but the Prime Minister managed to sideline him for a time. Notably, the imprisoned Karapetyan announced on August 13 the creation of a new movement, which will serve as the basis for the formation of a new political force.
Risks of economic loss
The rapprochement between Armenia and the EU is directly reflected in Russia’s share of Armenia’s overall trade. Currently, Russia accounts for roughly 40% of Armenia’s foreign trade, enabling the Kremlin to use economic influence as a tool of political pressure. Moscow openly warns Yerevan that in case of deepening integration with the EU, Armenia will face a complete overhaul of its economic relations with Russia. As Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk stated “it will not work to sit on two chairs at the same time,” Yerevan will have to make a choice. For comparison, he said, in 2024 the trade turnover between Armenia and the Eurasian Economic Union increased to $12.7 billion (Russia’s share was $12.4 billion), while the trade turnover between Armenia and the EU was only $2.1 billion. Armenia’s path toward European integration is likely to be lengthy, and Moscow may attempt to undermine the country’s economic stability by imposing various artificial obstacles. According to the Armenian Statistics Committee, trade turnover with Russia decreased by $3.7 billion (-62.5%) in January-April 2025, due to a 72.7% drop in imports and a 6.8% drop in exports. Experts believe that this is due to import substitution programs launched in Russia, and on the other hand, new restrictions on parallel imports to bypass sanctions imposed on Russia, which are hurting countries that previously served as intermediaries for Western products to Russia. In Armenia, it is believed that Russia may be behind the recent difficulties faced by exporters of alcoholic beverages, caused by delays in the transit of trucks carrying Armenian cognac through Georgian territory. In addition, according to media reports, the transit of Russian liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Armenia through Georgia has been disrupted, resulting in a 40% increase in prices on the Armenian market. Based on these incidents, the media suggests that Russia may be trying to economically harm Armenia “through other’s hands”, which resembles a tactic of hybrid economic pressure. It should also be noted that Russia supplies roughly 85% of Armenia’s natural gas, and Gazprom largely controls the country’s energy infrastructure, granting the Kremlin additional leverage over Yerevan.
Conclusion
Armenia’s move toward closer ties with the West is a tangible reality, taking place against the backdrop of Yerevan’s evident distancing from Moscow. Clearly, the Kremlin cannot tolerate the loss of the “traditional sphere of influence” it has maintained for decades in the South Caucasus without taking retaliatory measures. It is expected that, in the near future, Russia will further intensify both economic pressure and attempts to interfere in Armenia’s domestic politics to hinder Armenia’s pro-Western foreign policy trajectory. The Kremlin is likely to intensify its efforts to discredit the Pashinyan government and create a competitive pro-Russian political alternative force for the upcoming 2026 parliamentary elections. On the other hand, active political and economic support from the US and the EU will play a crucial role in enabling Armenia to withstand external pressure, maintain internal stability, and pursue its pro-Western transformation.