Author: Rezi Topuria, UGSPN Research Fellow
It is clear that in recent years the international order created in the last century has been undergoing change. However, it remains unclear where this transformation will lead and what the new order will look like. It is evident that many actors are attempting to exploit this uncertainty to their advantage, but among the most visible are the efforts of the People’s Republic of China.
China is precisely the state that for several years has openly challenged the unipolar international order. Moreover, Xi Jinping has even articulated China’s desire to change the existing system and play a greater role within it from the podium of the United Nations. Whereas China previously followed Deng Xiaoping’s well-known doctrine—“hide your strength and bide your time”—in the era of Xi Jinping the “Middle Kingdom” has adopted a far more active foreign policy. This is clearly reflected in China’s numerous international initiatives.
After consolidating power at the domestic level, Xi announced the expansion of China’s influence. The first clear manifestation of China’s global ambitions was the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 (initially referred to as One Belt, One Road). The stated goal of the initiative is to strengthen connectivity and cooperation among countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond through infrastructure development, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange. The BRI seeks to revive and expand the ancient Silk Road trade routes, thereby facilitating global trade and investment. However, critics argue that the BRI has been more focused on enhancing China’s domestic and international image—on the one hand, boosting Xi Jinping’s approval ratings at home, and on the other, establishing a new global image of China on the international stage.
Following its announcement, more than 140 countries and international organizations signed cooperation agreements with China under the BRI framework. At the same time, China invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects across various countries. However, the BRI’s decade-long history has also shown that, in practice, the project has not proven to be as large-scale as originally envisioned.
Nevertheless, China’s global vision is not limited to the Belt and Road Initiative alone. On the contrary, China is gradually changing its approach to the BRI; at this stage, the “Middle Kingdom” is increasingly cautious about making large-scale investments abroad and has shifted its focus toward other initiatives.
China’s global aspirations and ambitions are more comprehensively articulated in initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Notably, all three initiatives were announced within the past few years and reflect China’s current vision and plans more clearly than the BRI.
China’s New Initiatives
China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) is a comprehensive strategy that, according to official Beijing, aims to promote global development through inclusive, sustainable, and cooperative approaches. President Xi Jinping introduced the initiative in September 2021 at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly. It focuses on key areas such as poverty reduction, food security, health, and climate change.
Explicitly, one of the initiative’s main objectives is to create an inclusive platform for global cooperation, with a particular emphasis on “small but effective projects” that directly improve people’s lives.
It is worth noting that the initial GDI projects are less focused on infrastructure development and instead emphasize humanitarian initiatives—for example, poverty alleviation in Mozambique and food access programs in Togo. Georgia is not mentioned among the first wave of GDI projects.
The Global Development Initiative was followed on March 15, 2023, by a keynote address delivered by Xi Jinping at a high-level meeting with global political parties, titled “China’s Global Vision: A Comprehensive Approach to Modernization and Development.” This speech is referred to as the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). In this address, Xi Jinping emphasized that the central principle of China’s global vision is the belief that countries should help one another succeed. According to President Xi, modernization should be a collective effort whose benefits are shared by all nations. From the initiative’s perspective, this implies promoting common development through solidarity and cooperation, guided by the principles of joint contribution and shared benefits. The document stresses that modernization should not be a uniform, one-size-fits-all process, but rather one that allows countries to develop in ways best suited to their specific circumstances.
It should be noted that the GCI currently lacks a formal structure or group uniting participating countries. The GCI is a vague concept through which Beijing calls for enhanced dialogue among civilizations while simultaneously presenting itself as a guarantor of peace and a mediator between states.
Finally, China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), also proposed by President Xi Jinping, represents China’s response to the multifaceted security challenges of the contemporary world. The GSI effectively complements the two initiatives mentioned above, emphasizing the importance of adapting to a rapidly changing international landscape and seeking to address the root causes of global conflicts.
Through these initiatives, China simultaneously challenges Western hegemony in international politics and asserts that modernization does not equate to Westernization. Instead, China offers alternative paths for development and security that allow countries to preserve their sovereignty. Moreover, while Western initiatives often condition assistance on the implementation of liberal reforms, China’s initiatives lack such explicit requirements, raising suspicions that China’s interests lie elsewhere.
China’s Initiatives Today
While China’s initiatives were previously more abstract in nature, in recent years China has sought to promote them more actively.
For example, in September 2025, Xi Jinping introduced yet another initiative—the Global Governance Initiative—which adds to the existing three initiatives and aims to reform global governance and reduce Western (primarily American) influence. At last year’s UN General Assembly, Chinese Premier Li Qiang criticized unilateralism and American hegemonism and once again emphasized China’s initiatives.
In January of this year, China’s ambassador to Canada published an op-ed titled “Advancing the Global Security Initiative—Deepening International Law Enforcement Cooperation,” emphasizing that the GSI should be used to respond to new global security challenges such as telecommunications fraud and transnational crime. The article presents the GSI as a vision that promotes dialogue, partnership, and shared security rather than confrontation or bloc-based politics.
In this way, China seeks to portray the GSI as a practically relevant initiative that addresses concrete security challenges beyond traditional military threats, particularly in the context of law enforcement cooperation between China and other countries.
Moreover, China has recently intensified its promotion of the Global Security Initiative in South Asia as part of a broader strategy to expand its security influence without creating formal military alliances. In the region, Beijing advances the GSI narrative through key regional forums and diplomatic engagements, presenting it as a holistic security framework based on principles such as “indivisible security,” respect for sovereignty, and opposition to bloc-based security arrangements.
In practice, however, the initiative functions more as a strategic narrative umbrella that legitimizes and reframes existing bilateral security ties rather than as a collective security institution. This is evident in the case of Pakistan, where military and counterterrorism cooperation existed prior to the emergence of the GSI but is now routinely presented as part of China’s global stability vision. Similar dynamics can be observed in Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, where cooperation often focuses on law enforcement, training, and technological assistance rather than multilateral commitments.
Analysts note that the GSI’s flexibility and lack of binding commitments or formal structures provide China with significant room to adapt its engagement in South Asia and the broader Asian region to existing political opportunities. Rather than constructing a collective regional security architecture, China emphasizes discourse and norms that challenge Western, alliance-based models, while presenting itself as a defender of sovereignty and strategic autonomy. At the same time, smaller Asian states often use the GSI as a balancing tool in their relations with China, India, and Western powers, while benefiting from capacity-building opportunities and diplomatic support.
Conclusion
Through these initiatives—particularly the Global Security Initiative—China seeks to present itself as a global superpower. The timing is strategically advantageous: post-pandemic recovery, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and a polarized world provide fertile ground for the broader dissemination of China’s initiatives. Moreover, a clear vacuum has emerged between the disintegration of the old international order and the formation of a new one, creating space for China to assert its role.
However, these initiatives remain highly general and theoretical, and they lack formal structures and effective mechanisms. Despite China’s declared global ambitions, the Global Security Initiative is, at this stage, primarily aimed at Central and South Asian countries in order to undermine the United States’ role and vision in Asia’s security architecture. For years, China has sought to expand its financial and geopolitical influence in the region through various means, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative. In each case, the objective is the same: to increase China’s influence and reduce American dominance.
At present, only Russia has openly expressed readiness to support this initiative, while others view it with skepticism. There is little interest from either the European Union or China’s neighboring countries. Given China’s current policies in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan, it is unrealistic to expect countries to entrust China with ensuring international security. Ultimately, it can be argued that this initiative is aimed less at global security and more explicitly at enhancing China’s role in international politics.
These initiatives primarily represent China’s attempt to shape a post-Western, multipolar world and embed its own interests in the global agenda. While it remains difficult to predict how successfully China will achieve these goals and institutionalize these initiatives, they nonetheless offer a clear demonstration of China’s global ambitions at this stage.