Author: Vazha Sopromadze, UGSPN Research Fellow
Introduction
Modern Russia needs to legitimize a policy rooted in force, revanchism, and lies, both domestically and internationally. Therefore, the system seeks to create an alternative and manipulable reality in which the Kremlin’s destructive foreign policy and authoritarian domestic rule appear to rest on a solid foundation. As a result, a significant part of Russian society not only tolerates but often accepts and even believes in the alternative reality offered by the state. The state apparatus, engaged in constructing this reality, fully controls the education system, the media environment, and public discourse.
For the Kremlin, it is fundamentally important that the historical narratives it constructs dominate not only in Russia but also in the former Soviet republics. Given the authoritarian nature of the system, the Kremlin does not allow any ambiguity, whether regarding the past or the present. Since the Kremlin cannot offer its population a unifying modern idea, it is fundamentally important for the system to create a shared historical past – the primary factor of social cohesion. For this reason, the system employs, among other tools, legislative mechanisms to guarantee the inviolability of a historical discourse acceptable to the Kremlin.
Several Cases of Manipulating Recent History
To some extent, all states reinterpret or manipulate the Middle Ages or earlier historical periods. However, reinterpreting relatively recent events, especially those on which a public consensus had seemed to emerge since the Perestroika era – clearly indicates the Kremlin’s attempt to rewrite history. For example, modern Kremlin propaganda justifies the Soviet Union’s deployment of troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, a large-scale campaign is underway to revise the narrative of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. From multiple platforms, high-ranking officials declare that the collapse of the USSR was illegitimate, thereby seeking primarily to undermine the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics.
One of the most striking examples of the Kremlin’s manipulation of history is its long-running campaign against Ukrainian statehood. The main goal of this campaign is to convince both Russian and foreign audiences that Ukraine is an artificial construct. In this instance, such manipulations are not confined to a specific historical period. The Kremlin’s claims range from the Christianization of Kyivan Rus’ in the 10th century to the Soviet-era transfer of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine in the second half of the 20th century. The entire state machine is involved in the campaign to diminish Ukraine’s statehood, from rank-and-file propagandists to top-level political officials. President Putin himself regularly refers to Ukraine as an artificial entity in his public addresses. By stripping Kyiv of agency, the Kremlin indirectly seeks to justify its aggression against the modern Ukrainian state.
The West as a Constructed Enemy
Through historical manipulation, the system seeks to build a discourse portraying the “collective West” as having tried in the past, and as continuing to try today, to destabilize and dismember Russia (formerly the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire) from within. Kremlin propaganda presents a narrative in which, according to a supposed grand plan, actors serving the interests of the “collective West” were embedded within Russia’s political and economic elite as early as the 1990s. According to this narrative, these infiltrated actors played a significant role during Yeltsin’s rule, and their actions caused the social and economic crises of that period. The same narrative asserts that their influence diminished significantly after Putin came to power. From that point onward, the “West” allegedly sought to destabilize Russia through co-opted opposition parties and civil society representatives. In the Kremlin’s storyline, alongside this domestic threat, the narrative posits a foreign component of the “grand plan”, through puppet regimes in Russia’s immediate neighborhood and NATO expansion, the “West” is attempting to encircle Russia.
Moscow’s manipulation of history expands even further, ranging from the supposed Western-orchestrated disintegration of Yugoslavia to the “artificial rise of Nazism” in Eastern Europe and the alleged imposition of a neo-Nazi regime in Ukraine. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has framed the dynamics of Russia–Georgia relations as part of this broader anti-Russian Western strategy. For instance, a new school textbook, approved a few years ago and edited by Putin’s advisor and former Minister of Culture, depicts the 2008 Russia–Georgia war as an “attack by the pro-American Saakashvili regime on the so-called South Ossetia a regime which, according to the text, Russia shares centuries of friendship and a common history with.”
“May 9” – From Honoring the Fallen to the Cult of “Victory”
The most extensive case of systematic historical revisionism by the Kremlin concerns World War II, as Moscow deliberately distorts memory of the war and imposes a new historical narrative on its people. According to this narrative, the “Russian world” and the “Russian idea” are endowed with a special civilizational and historical mission.
The Kremlin has withheld archival data on World War II, including records of actual losses and other key details. Moscow constructs a narrative suggesting that victory in the war was solely the achievement of the Soviet Union equated exclusively with the Russian people. By disregarding objective historical facts, the Kremlin minimizes the contributions of the Allies and Eastern European countries in defeating Nazism. At the same time, the sacrifices of other Soviet republics’ peoples are presented as an organic part of “Great Russia’s” supposed invincibility.
During Putin’s rule, “May 9” – a date which, both in the Soviet Union and in the early years of independent Russia, was primarily associated with remembering the tens of millions of soldiers who died in the war has been transformed into a militaristic cult that reinforces and disseminates the Kremlin’s revanchist ideology.
Notably, the Soviet authorities did not hold annual large-scale military parades to mark victory in World War II. The first “Victory Parade” was held on June 24, 1945, but it was a one-time event. Moreover, until 1965 the date did not even have the status of a state holiday. The commemoration of the “October Revolution” on November 7 was far more important to the Soviet state, and it was on that date that massive parades, including military displays, were held annually. Annual celebrations of “May 9” began only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during Yeltsin’s second presidential term. It was under Putin, however, that “May 9” became the main national holiday. From his first years in office, large-scale military parades were introduced, with preparations involving the entire state apparatus. To properly assess these developments, it is important to consider the domestic political context: by the end of Putin’s second term, the economic and social situation had improved significantly, but the system had failed to develop the foundation for a new ideology. In retrospect, it is clear that the regime chose to capitalize on the past, and the most rational focus was victory in World War II.
“May 9” as an Instrument of Legitimization
The regime has constructed a narrative in which the Russian Federation, as the heir of the Soviet Union, is endowed with a special “historical mission” to defend traditional values and morality. After the launch of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Putin repeatedly declared that Russia was once again fighting a new form of fascism.
At the “May 9” parades of 2022 and 2023, Putin directly drew parallels between the struggle against Nazi Germany and the so-called “special operation” in Ukraine. Through such rhetoric, the Kremlin seeks to distort historical memory and to use these narratives to conceal war crimes, political repression, and restrictions on civil liberties. The fight against fascism has become a universal instrument for suppressing alternative views and branding individuals or groups as “enemies of the homeland.”
The Militarist Festivities and Their Features
Since the late 2000s, the focus of the parades has shifted from honoring veterans and remembering fallen soldiers to showcasing military hardware and modern weaponry. Children and teenagers began to be involved in the festivities, and it was during this period that one of the most well-known slogans of Russia’s contemporary revanchist foreign policy first emerged: “We can do it again” (можем повторить). It should also be noted that, parallel to the main parade in the capital, various compulsory events take place across the country, including in schools and even kindergartens. A special place in modern “May 9” commemorations belongs to the so-called Immortal Regiment (бессмертный полк). Initially a grassroots civil initiative, it involved people marching with portraits of relatives who had died in the war or who were veterans. Starting in 2015, however, the state began appropriating the event, handing its organization over to the Kremlin-controlled All-Russia People’s Front (ОНФ). The voluntary and spontaneous character of the march quickly disappeared, and participation became mandatory for employees of state-funded institutions. During the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021), the march was held online, but it resumed in 2022 after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine began. Alongside photos of WWII veterans, portraits of soldiers killed in Russia’s war against Ukraine were also carried. By then, the march had become a global phenomenon, which, according to Russian propaganda, was held in various forms in more than 80 countries. However, since 2022, the march has been banned in the U.S. (partially), the U.K., Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Estonia. In Georgia, Immortal Regiment events have been held on varying scales since 2017. This year, media reported that a small group of citizens organized a similar event in Vake Park, Tbilisi.
Another prominent tool of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine is the Night Wolves motorcycle club, founded in the late 1980s as one of the first biker groups in the Soviet Union. Since the 2010s, the organization has become increasingly visible in the Kremlin’s media space. The club’s leader, Alexander Zaldastanov, nicknamed “The Surgeon,” has appeared with President Putin at multiple public events. Investigative reports have shown that the club’s activities were directly financed through state grants. Substantively, the club’s work aligns with the concept of the so-called “Russian World,” which combines pseudo-religious, imperialist, and nationalist rhetoric with corresponding symbolism.
Since 2014, the Night Wolves have organized motorcycle rallies to celebrate “May 9”, the most famous route being Moscow–Berlin. In recent years, however, EU member states have banned the group’s activities on their territories. For instance, as early as 2016 Poland deemed the club as a threat to national security. The Baltic states barred their entry for violating sanctions, and many other European countries have refused the organization permission to hold events. Nevertheless, individual members still manage to stage small-scale events within EU countries.
In Georgia, the Night Wolves visited in 2015 and 2017 with small groups, participating in various ceremonial events. Notably, on April 27 of this year, Mamuka Pipia, leader of the pro-Russian party “Solidarity for Peace”, met with Zaldastanov in Moscow and invited him to Georgia.
Conclusion
The systematic historical revisionism of Putin’s Russia is not merely a reconsideration of attitudes toward the past; it is a deliberate political project serving the regime’s need for legitimization, domestic consolidation, and the justification of external aggression. Through distorted historical narratives, the Kremlin seeks to construct an alternative reality in which Russia is simultaneously portrayed as a victim and as embodying a myth of invincibility.
The instrumentalization of “May 9”, the delegitimization of Ukrainian and other post-Soviet states’ sovereignty, and the moral rehabilitation of the Soviet past together create the ideological foundation for the system’s functioning. In Russia, history has become a tool of state propaganda, where control over the past means preserving power in the present while simultaneously shaping the future to serve the regime’s interests.
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author