Author: Giorgi Bilanishvili, Senior Fellow at UGSPN
In the wake of the military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, most foreign analysts and experts have focused on Russia’s substantial financial gains from rising oil prices and increased demand for Russian crude. This is indeed the case: before the war, Russian oil was sold at a discount (for example, in February the average price was $44.6 per barrel). Now, mostly its price is higher than Middle East oil, meaning that its value has more than doubled. Each $10 increase per barrel brings Russia an additional $1.1–1.2 billion in monthly revenue.
At the same time, the immediate and future consequences of the Middle East crisis are far more significant for Russia in political terms. For Moscow, Iran is more than just a regional partner. Alongside Russia and China, Iran belongs to the group of states seeking to reduce Western influence and establish a new international order more favorable to their interests. Accordingly, Moscow is deeply invested in preserving a friendly regime in Tehran. Yet it also values its relations not only with the United States and Israel but with Arab states as well. Beyond this, several other issues stand out: the impact of the military campaign against Iran on U.S. positions in global politics, on transatlantic relations, and on Russia’s objectives in Ukraine. Thus, while increased revenues are important, they represent only one component of Russia’s broader calculus. In practice, Moscow’s positioning toward the Middle East crisis and its perception of the objectives behind the military campaign against Iran should be assessed by taking into account several different aspects.
Russia’s Political Stance
According to the official website of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin first expressed his stance on the Middle East crisis on March 1, when he described the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law.” Notably, however, he did not mention the United States or Israel. The same website also provides information about Putin’s telephone conversations with leaders of Iran, the U.S., and Arab states. Taken together, these details suggest that despite a strategic partnership agreement with Iran, Putin has refrained from offering Tehran unequivocal support, instead adopting a more neutral posture.
This approach can be explained by several factors, including Putin’s desire to play a significant role in defusing the Middle East crisis, which would enhance his political weight internationally and increase his influence over the actors involved in the crisis. His attempt to assume the role of mediator is not new. In August of last year, when the U.S. and Israel first launched a military campaign against Iran, Putin offered mediation, but President Trump rejected the proposal. This time, Putin sought to negotiate with Trump on transferring Iran’s enriched uranium to Russia, a move that would have brought him significant political dividends both in managing the conflict and beyond. Yet once again, Trump rejected the offer.
A somewhat different picture emerges by synthesizing statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry and positions expressed by the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the crisis in the Middle East. Their tone toward the U.S. and Israel is generally harsher and more critical. Looking back, however, the stance of the foreign ministry and the minister himself was quite strict on U.S. mediation in the Ukraine conflict and on U.S.-Russia relations. By contrast, Putin himself, his press secretary Dmitry Peskov, his aide Yuri Ushakov, and special envoy Kirill Dmitriev adopted more moderate and constructive positions regarding the U.S. Thus, the divergence in tone regarding Iran is not accidental but rather a deliberate distribution of roles among different actors.
Beyond rhetoric, Moscow has not shown strong public support for Iran in its political actions. For example, Russia did not join but did not veto the UN Security Council resolution condemning Iran’s missile strikes on neighboring Arab states. In this case, Moscow’s position was shaped less by U.S. and Israeli interests than by its partnerships with Arab countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates, which serves as a key logistical and financial hub for sanctions‑hit Russia, and Saudi Arabia, its main partner within OPEC+.
The Impact of the Middle East Crisis on Transatlantic Relations
Problems within transatlantic relations that have existed since the Soviet era often created opportunities for Moscow to position itself more actively in international politics and advance its own interests. Nowadays, as Russia wages a full‑scale military aggression aimed not only at Ukraine but also at dismantling the Euro‑Atlantic security architecture, the dynamics among NATO member states have become even more significant for Moscow. With the start of President Trump’s second term, certain difficulties emerged in transatlantic relations. At the same time, the Trump administration shifted its approach toward Ukraine: support weakened, relations with Russia were restored, and pressure was placed on Kyiv to make concessions to Moscow in pursuit of a peace agreement.
Amid the military operation launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran on February 28, the tendency toward deepening problems in the transatlantic partnership became evident. Washington did not consult its NATO allies before initiating the campaign against Iran, which is one sign of the problems. After the operation began, relations first deteriorated between the U.S. and Spain, as Madrid refused Washington permission to use the joint U.S.-Spanish air base on Spanish territory for the campaign. In response, Trump adopted a very harsh stance toward Spain. He then criticized the British Prime Minister and expressed skepticism toward several European leaders, dissatisfied with the level of support they offered for the campaign against Iran. His rhetoric later became sharply critical, accusing transatlantic allies of cowardice. Finally, Trump told The Telegraph that he considered pulling the United States out of NATO. A similar position was also confirmed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Trump’s skepticism toward NATO is not new. His former National Security Advisor John Bolton wrote in his book published in 2020 that during Trump’s first term, he came very close to deciding on withdrawal. In a 2022 interview with The Washington Post, Bolton claimed that had Trump been re‑elected in 2020, he would have pulled the U.S. out of NATO. For European leaders, Trump’s attitude should not be considered a novelty. They are well aware of his administration’s different approach to Euro‑Atlantic partnership and have already begun strengthening their own defense and security capabilities (more on this topic is available here).
Although Trump’s statements about a possible NATO exit are consistent with his administration’s overall policy, the reality points in the opposite direction. Not only do allies need U.S. support, but the U.S. itself also requires allied backing. Another factor to consider is that Trump does not have the power to make a decision to leave NATO unilaterally. Under a law passed by Congress in 2023, Senate approval by a two‑thirds majority is required to fulfill this decision. Moreover, with Trump’s approval ratings at their lowest point ahead of the fall congressional elections, such a decision would further damage both his standing and that of the Republican Party. In addition, most experts predict that Democrats will gain majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, which would give them real leverage over Trump’s policies.
For Moscow, as noted earlier, cracks in Euro‑Atlantic unity are naturally seen as positive. The question, however, is whether the current situation creates real opportunities for Moscow to advance its foreign policy agenda. In essence, the situation is not new; it is more a continuation of an existing trend. Although this trend has been persistent for over a year, Moscow has not yet achieved tangible results either in Ukraine or in dismantling the Euro‑Atlantic security architecture.
Looking at assessments from Russian experts, it becomes clear that from Moscow’s perspective, the more important outcomes are those that will materialize after the military operation against Iran, as well as clarifying the true motivations behind the Trump administration’s decision to launch it. Fyodor Lukyanov, one of Russia’s leading analysts on international relations, argues that developments around Iran should be placed within the broader context of dismantling regional order in the Middle East, a process that began with the first Gulf War in 1991, continued with the Iraq War in 2003, and was reinforced by events such as the Arab Spring and the wars in Syria and Libya. Dmitri Trenin, director of the Institute of World Economy and Strategy at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), believes that by starting the military operation against Iran, Trump ultimately abandoned his initially declared goals and returned to Washington’s traditional global agenda, openly relying on military force. In his view, even after Trump’s election, the U.S. remained Russia’s adversary on Ukraine. He also highlights that the main U.S. negotiators were the same – Witkoff and Kushner, on both the Iran and Ukraine talks. It is notable that Russian propaganda outlets have repeatedly emphasized Witkoff-Kushner’s alleged lack of integrity, suggesting that negotiations were used by Washington as a cover to prepare military operations against Russia, as they claim happened in Iran.
Ivan Timofeev, program director at the Valdai Club, argues that the strike on Iran demonstrated that state leaders and senior officials have become priority targets. He stresses that Russia is acutely aware of the risks facing its own leadership. He further contends that after sanctions, the use of military force has become an established practice, making armed conflicts between Russia and the West in some form inevitable. Taken together, these and other Russian experts’ views highlight Russia’s determination that the U.S. must not emerge victorious from this conflict, especially if it results in regime change in Iran. Accordingly, even amid attempts to normalize relations with the Trump administration, Russia continues to view the U.S. as its principal adversary in the long term.
Conclusion
Moscow interprets the military operation against Iran as part of a chain of past and ongoing events, including the loss of allied regimes in Syria and Venezuela, and developments in Cuba (more on this topic is available here). From Russia’s perspective, the case of Iran reflects Washington’s drive to strengthen its global influence, particularly by seeking control over energy resources. This is relevant both to Venezuela and Iran, as according to statistical data, they rank first and third in oil reserves, while Iran holds the world’s largest gas reserves and Venezuela the eighth.
For Moscow, the Iranian context is broader, and its worst‑case scenario envisages an armed confrontation with the U.S. Thus, it is crucial for Russia that Washington not achieve an unconditional victory in Iran or install a regime favorable to its interests. Despite this outlook, Moscow acts cautiously to avoid damaging relations with the Trump administration, Israel, and Arab states. Moreover, Russia, already heavily engaged in its aggression against Ukraine, lacks the resources to provide Iran with substantial assistance.
Given that both Moscow and, likely, Beijing view developments around Iran within the framework of broader geopolitical confrontation with the U.S., the likelihood of deepening defense and security cooperation between Russia and China increases. This may be reflected in formal agreements. The 2001 Treaty of “Good‑Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” between Russia and China expires this year, and work has already begun on its renewal. It is possible that the new treaty will include expanded provisions on defense and security, reflecting the shared perception of the U.S. as their principal adversary.
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author.