Author: Khatia Davlianidze, UGSPN Research Fellow
Amidst a landscape where the majority of candidate states on the path to European Union integration are experiencing stagnation or outright backsliding, Montenegro has effectively capitalized on the “window of opportunity” opened by the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war. Podgorica has sharply accelerated the pace of reforms that had been delayed for years, securing its position as a regional frontrunner precisely at a time when Brussels has revitalized its political interest in enlargement.
The integration process was infused with an entirely new dynamic, driven on one hand by the change of government in Montenegro in 2020, and on the other, by the clear political will demonstrated by the European Union itself. Consequently, on the 20th anniversary of the restoration of the country’s independence, the EU officially commenced work on the accession treaty.
On April 22, 2026, Brussels approved a special Ad Hoc Working Party comprised of member state representatives, whose mandate is to draft the legal intricacies of Montenegro’s integration. This initiative aims to enable Podgorica to achieve its targeted goal and become a member of the Union by 2028.
From Independence to Candidate Status
Montenegro’s European path officially began after the country restored its independence by seceding from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, subsequently submitting its official application for European Union membership in 2008.
In 2010, the European Commission issued a positive opinion on Montenegro’s application and granted the country candidate status. However, to open accession negotiations, Brussels outlined seven key priorities for Podgorica: strengthening the role of parliament and improving the electoral framework; reforming public administration based on the principles of depoliticization and meritocracy; reforming the judicial system and ensuring its independence; developing an anti-corruption strategy and effective enforcement mechanisms; intensifying the fight against organized crime; ensuring media freedom and cooperation with civil society; and implementing anti-discrimination legislation in practice while protecting the rights of internally displaced persons. Based on the progress achieved in fulfilling these priorities, the European Council opened the accession process in December 2011, and official negotiations commenced in June 2012.
The Frontrunner of the Enlargement Process
As of 2026, nine countries hold official candidate status for European Union membership, with only five currently in the active phase of negotiations.
On their path toward European integration, the Western Balkan countries face numerous systemic obstacles. For instance, Montenegro’s progress stands in stark contrast to that of Serbia, whose advancement is hindered by the unresolved issue of Kosovo and domestic authoritarian tendencies. Meanwhile, North Macedonia’s process, following a prolonged dispute with Greece over its name, is currently blocked by a Bulgarian veto. For its part, Albania was tied to North Macedonia’s “package” for years; however, following Brussels’ decision to decouple them, Tirana has managed to open its first negotiating cluster. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress is impeded by ethnic divisions and the separatism of Republic Srpska, whereas Kosovo still lacks even candidate status because its independence is not recognized by five EU member states. Given these dynamics, Montenegro is widely considered the undisputed frontrunner of the enlargement process. It is the only candidate country that has managed to open all 33 negotiating chapters (by comparison, Serbia has opened only 22). Moreover, Podgorica has already provisionally closed 16 chapters, with several more scheduled for completion in the near future.
Montenegro’s position is also significantly bolstered by foreign policy factors. The country fully and unconditionally aligns with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the sanctions imposed against Russia. Additionally, Montenegro has been a full member of NATO since 2017, which renders its Western trajectory predictable and geopolitically stable in the eyes of Brussels.
Technical Reforms and Fundamental Barriers
The European Union’s body of law (Chapters of the Acquis) is divided into 33 to 35 thematic chapters. Each candidate country progresses through three primary stages: screening (the assessment of legal alignment), the opening of a chapter (the initiation of direct negotiations), and provisional closure, which occurs when member states agree that the specific criteria have been met. Notably, in the event of democratic backsliding, the European Union retains the right to reopen a previously closed chapter. The final stage of accession requires the successful closure of all key thematic chapters, followed by the signing of the Accession Treaty and its mandatory ratification by the parliaments of all member states.
Although Montenegro has provisionally closed 16 out of 33 chapters to date, Brussels assesses that these achievements largely pertain to “easy” or technical issues. The core challenges remain within the so-called “Fundamentals” cluster, including the chapters on the rule of law and the judiciary, upon whose progress the fate of the entire integration process depends. The European Union demands tangible reforms in judicial independence, as well as in the fight against corruption and organized crime.
Domestic and Foreign Challenges
Montenegro holds the record for the longest-running accession negotiations in the history of the European Union. This protracted process is driven by complex domestic political and external factors, foremost among which is the legacy of a “captured state” and the resulting instability. From the dissolution of Yugoslavia until 2020, the country was uninterruptedly governed by Milo Đukanović’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Due to systemic corruption and organized crime, Montenegro was frequently characterized as a “captured state.” During this period, the ruling elite was so deeply intertwined with the state apparatus that reforms were practically paralyzed. The judiciary became a political tool in the hands of the ruling party, port cities evolved into regional smuggling hubs, and attacks on critical journalists posed a severe threat to media freedom.
Although Đukanović’s decades-long rule came to an end in 2020 through a coalition of opposition political parties, the change of government did not yield immediate progress. On the contrary, the country entered a phase of domestic political instability and chaos. The successive transitions between the Krivokapić and Abazović cabinets were accompanied by a gridlocked parliament and intense societal polarization, delaying pivotal reforms for years. Consequently, while Podgorica managed to maintain a superficially positive regional image, the rule of law, judicial independence, and an effective fight against corruption remain the country’s primary systemic challenges to this day.
This internal structural crisis is further exacerbated by foreign influences and the Serbo-Russian factor, which directly impact the country’s foreign policy trajectory. Montenegrin society is divided into pro-sovereignty and pro-Serbian camps. While one side supports an independent Montenegrin national identity, the other views itself as part of a broader Serbian national and cultural sphere. Through these pro-Serbian forces, Belgrade consistently maintains significant leverage over Podgorica’s domestic politics.
Geopolitical tensions peaked in 2016, just prior to Montenegro’s accession to NATO, when Russian and Serbian intelligence services orchestrated a failed coup d’état aimed at reversing the country’s pro-Western course.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the protracted integration process was conditioned not only by Montenegro’s internal challenges but also by the European Union’s own domestic trends and the so-called “enlargement fatigue.” Following Croatia’s accession to the bloc in 2013, Brussels’ enthusiasm for further enlargement noticeably waned.
Furthermore, the examples of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia clearly demonstrated to Brussels that certain states, upon entering the Union and gaining access to financial benefits, often begin a process of democratic backsliding and the erosion of legal standards. This experience forced the European Union to significantly tighten its criteria for Montenegro and other potential candidates, rendering the entire integration process far more cautious, stringent, and consequently, protracted.
Montenegro’s Accession Treaty: “Phased Integration” and the New Architecture of Enlargement
According to available information, approximately 80-85% of the text of Montenegro’s accession treaty will be identical to Croatia’s accession document, with the primary distinction lying in the introduction of new safeguard mechanisms. Montenegro will become the first candidate state whose terms of accession will be fully based on the European Union’s 2020 revised methodology. This approach was developed by Brussels to inject greater political dynamism into the enlargement process while simultaneously robustly protecting the Union’s internal security. The new strategy aims to prevent precedents similar to “Orbán’s Hungary,” where a member state initiates democratic backsliding after integrating into the bloc while concurrently obstructing the decision-making process within EU institutions through the use of veto power.
The central element of this new model is the concept of “phased integration” (or staged accession), which offers a state a gradual integration into the structures of the European Union. The initial stage of accession encompasses economic and sectoral dimensions, implying the candidate country’s gradual access to the EU Single Market, increased financial support, and membership in various sectoral agencies. The second and final stage entails full political membership – gaining representation in the core EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union), participating in the decision-making process, and being granted veto rights.
Unlike Croatia, which became a full member of the Union in 2013, if EU member states approve the “phased integration” mechanism, Montenegro’s model will initially envision integration into the EU Single Market and specific policy areas, albeit with a clear political restriction. Specifically, at this stage, Podgorica will not possess the right to exercise a veto on decisions within the European Council. This safeguard provides Brussels with a guarantee that the new member will not be able to paralyze the European Union’s foreign or domestic policy until the resilience of its democratic institutions is proven in practice post-accession.
A crucial difference between the accession treaties of Croatia and Montenegro will likely be reflected in the “reversibility and conditionality mechanisms.” The 2011 document signed with Croatia focused primarily on standard, time-bound transitional periods and three safeguard clauses (economic, internal market, and judiciary), which only envisioned interim monitoring prior to accession. In Montenegro’s case, however, the principle of conditionality will assume a permanent and indefinite character. Furthermore, a legal rule of reversibility will be explicitly codified in the treaty. Under this rule, if democratic backsliding or the erosion of the rule of law is detected in the country, Brussels will retain the right to automatically suspend specific benefits of membership and reopen previously closed negotiating chapters, without undergoing protracted bureaucratic procedures.
During Croatia’s integration period, Brussels lacked a leverage mechanism to restrict a member state’s access to European funds in the event of democratic backsliding. However, based on the “conditionality mechanism” that entered into force in 2021, the European Commission was granted direct authority to instantly freeze budgetary funding if a member state violates the principles of the rule of law. Thus, in the future, the financial support and political rights of both long-standing and newly acceded states will be directly proportional to the proper functioning of democratic institutions.
Conclusion
The crises and challenges experienced by the European Union since the last major enlargement in 2013 have exerted a fundamental influence on the Union’s policies, directly reflecting upon the substance and safeguard mechanisms of Montenegro’s accession treaty. Montenegro’s path toward EU integration demonstrates how success depends on the implementation of domestic reforms, the geopolitical context, the utilization of a “window of opportunity,” and the manifestation of political will from Brussels. Following prolonged stagnation, the heavy legacy of a “captured state,” and a struggle against negative external influences, Podgorica currently stands at the finish line of the European family. Montenegro’s case represents a vital test for the European Union itself; if the new methodology of “phased integration” and strict conditionality proves successful in practice, it will serve as an effective model for other candidate states that have spent years in the EU’s “waiting room.”
This article was translated from the original language with the assistance of AI tools and revised by the author.