Author: Vasil Ghlonti, International Security Expert
After the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel , various personnel and structural changes were made in Iran’s defense and security system. The top leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, that was eliminated by Israel, has been replaced with new personnel. At the same time, the well-known Iranian politician and former Speaker of the Majlis, Ali Larijani, was appointed as Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Additionally, by the decree of Iran’s leader Ayatollah Khamenei, on the initiative of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, and by the decision of the Supreme National Security Council, a Defense Council was established.
Losses in the Guard Corps and military structures
During the war that began on 13 June 2025, the Israeli armed forces, with the assistance of military intelligence ‘Aman’ and foreign intelligence ‘Mossad,’ almost completely destroyed the leadership of Iran’s Guard Corps and the General Staff of the armed forces. It is noteworthy that the position of Chief of General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces was previously traditionally held by a representative of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, most recently by its now-eliminated senior member, General Mohammad Bagheri. It was through him that the Corps controlled the Iranian Armed Forces. Establishing control over various state structures through their own, officially embedded representatives is a well-known tactical method of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. For example, the Iranian Ministry of Information (security and intelligence) is run in a similar style by the Corps and is headed by Esmail Khatib, one of the founders and former heads of the Corps’ intelligence unit. It is noteworthy that after General Bagheri’s elimination by Israel, Major General Seyed Abdolrahim Mousavi was appointed to the important position of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, who, unlike his predecessors, is not affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard Corps. This fact leads us to consider that Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei has changed his tactics regarding the armed forces, betrayed the previously existing tradition, and, in order to balance power within the military sphere, promoted not a member of the Guard Corps but an army general. Notably, in addition to high-ranking officials, Israel also managed to eliminate second-tier representatives of the Guard Corps senior officials. Among them was the head of the ‘Palestinian Corps,’ which is part of the special Al-Quds unit of the Guard Corps, Saeed Izadi, killed in the religious Iranian city of Qom. Interestingly, in the period leading up to the terrorist attack on 7 October 2023, Israeli intelligence and military structures had accused him of financing and arming the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas. It is highly likely that Israeli special services had precise information about it, as Iranian intelligence agencies, and especially the Guard Corps, have long been assisting Palestinian group Hamas in military and intelligence matters.
Moreover, the Iranian intelligence service, together with the Lebanese Hezbollah, was providing Hamas with intelligence through a Lebanon-based intelligence center against Israel. Interestingly, alongside Saeed Yezadi, Behnam Shahriar, a representative of the special Al-Quds operations unit in Lebanon, also became a casualty, which leads us to think that Israel aims to simultaneously eliminate high-ranking representatives of Iran’s intelligence services and the international terrorist network closely associated with them. In this context, another noteworthy detail can be mentioned: before the terrorist attack carried out by Hamas on 7 October 2023, fighters of the Palestinian terrorist organization trained on Iranian territory at a military base of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps alongside members of the pro-Iranian terrorist organization Islamic Jihad, with the head of the IRGC’s Special Forces, General Esmail Qaani, present. These facts directly indicate that Iran was an organizer of the 7 October terrorist attack.
However, according to the statement made by Esmail Qaani on 3 October 2025, he, like Hassan Nasrallah and Ismail Haniyeh, learned about the start of the 7 October terrorist attack only after the fact.
Ineffectiveness of the Guard Corps counterintelligence
The ineffective counterintelligence activities of the Guard Corps were undoubtedly exacerbated by the fact that they failed to ensure the security of top Iranian nuclear physicists involved in the nuclear program and to protect nuclear facilities from aerial attacks. This, among other things, caused significant reputational damage to the Guard Corps. It is also noteworthy that both before and during the war, Iran’s counterintelligence structures failedto detect and dismantlenumerous espionage networks operatingwithin thecountry, indicating an insufficient level ofpreparedness. This assessment is further supported by the fact that, according to statements from Israeli intelligence services, they had a significant number of agents, including women, on Iranian territory both before and during the 12-day war. Many of them were also Iranian dissidents who had likely fled the Iranian regime abroad at some point. The undeniable fact is that the free movement and operation of Israeli agents within Iranian territory points to the ineffectiveness of the Iranian counterintelligence services. The combination of these facts and circumstances undoubtedly placed the influence and functioning of the Guard Corps under significant question. However, the war between Iran and Israel ended in a short period, which gave the Iranian authorities a chance to regain their composure and effectively save the IRGC from total destruction. It is a fact that since the ruling mullahs’ regime in Iran primarily relies domestically on the Guard Corps as a repressive apparatus and uses it to subjugate the Iranian people, the upper echelons were forgiven for the mistakes made during the Iran-Israel war.
Personnel changes within the Guard Corps
General Mohammad Pakfour, the former head of the corps’ ground forces, was appointed as the new commander of the Guard Corps, while General Mohammad Karami took up the position of the commander of the Guard Corps ground forces. Additionally, the experienced general Abdul Rahim Mousavi was named as the chief of staff of the armed forces. At the same time, General Ali Abdolahim became the chief of staff of ‘Khatam al-Anbiya,’ the largest military sub-structure of the Guard Corps. It is noteworthy that the Iranian authorities seem to somewhat intimidate opposition forces and a significant part of the population dissatisfied with its policies and may use these battle-tested generals against them if necessary. It is also notable that General Majid Khademi, who previously led the internal security organization (IRGC’s Protection and Intelligence Organization, Sazman-e Hefazat-e Sepah), was appointed as the head of intelligence for the Guard Corps.
The appointment of the former head of internal security to the position of intelligence chief of the same organization is apparently linked to the desire of Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to further strengthen internal control over the intelligence service of this key structure.
Personnel changes within Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
Against such a complex background, undoubtedly special attention is deserved by the appointment of Ali Ardashir Larijani, a well-known politician and former Speaker of Iran’s National Assembly, to Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, one of the most important and influential positions in the Iranian government, which he had already held from 2005 to 2007. The official chairman of this council is considered to be the President of Iran, who selects and presents its secretary. Subsequently, this candidacy is confirmed by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. This structure is responsible for developing the country’s defense and security policy and, to this end, carries out other related functions.
Ali Larijani is one of the most influential figures of the Islamic Republic and a representative of the Larijani clan, who have always held high positions in Iran’s government circles. It is noteworthy that his brother, Sadeq Ardeshir Larijani, holds the position of chairman of one of Iran’s most influential legal institutions, the Expediency Discernment Council, and he is often even considered one of the political heirs of Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Obviously, Ali Larijani’s appointment to such a high and important position announced, on 7 August 2025, was not accidental. Moreover, alongside his membership inthe Ayatollah’s family, Larijani has the support of the Revolutionary Guards, as he served in this militarized elite structure for about 10 years and even holds the rank of brigadier general. Most likely, his reappointment to this position was also influenced by the fact that Ali Larijani is considered a trusted figure by both the Ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guards, especially during such a challenging period, and is able to maintain unity between these institutions. In addition, he is considered a politician capable of dialogue with the West, which is something the Iranian regime desperately needs at this stage. It is highly likely that along with restoring relations with the West, Ali Larijani will also be responsible for deepening relations with Russia. This is suggested by the fact that almost a month before his appointment to the new position, he visited Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The formation of the Defense Council
It is noteworthy that based on the order of Ayatollah Khamenei, the initiative of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the decision of the Supreme National Security Council, the new Defense Council was formed, which practically coincided in time with Ali Larijani’s appointment. The new body will officially report to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The functions of the Council include developing defense strategies and strengthening the capabilities of the armed forces. It will include the leaders of all three branches of governmentand the country’s top military command, as well as representatives of the relevant ministries. More specifically, it consists of the president as chairman, the speaker of parliament, the head of the judicial system, two representatives appointed by the leader of the Islamic Revolution, the minister of security, the chief of the armed forces staff, the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the army. In addition, reports indicate that the head of the central staff of Khatam al-Anbiya, the command for special situations, the largest military unit of the Revolutionary Guards, will also join. Such solid representation suggests that this structure will have considerable influence over ongoing processes in Iran’s military sector.
Conclusion
The ongoing processes in Iran’s defense and security sector, specifically personnel and structural changes, are directly influenced by the outcome of the twelve-day Iran-Israel war. Iran’s intelligence services and military structures suffered a major defeat during this war due to a low level of military readiness and preparation. In fact, Iran’s most well-prepared and well-funded militarized organization suffered significant casualties among its ranks in the face of large-scale military attacks by Israeli intelligence and military structures. This war demonstrated the superiority of Israel’s military and security capabilities. However, within a relatively short time, Iran’s state system emerged from an extremely difficult situation and restored its military and security institutions more or less to normal. The personnel changes carried out in the Guard Corps show that Iran’s intelligence services and military structures have considerable reserves and that the replacement of old personnel with new ones does not pose a serious problem. Apparently, this organization will not easily relinquish the reins of power. Despite the failures of Iran’s intelligence services, including in matters concerning the development of the nuclear program, they managed to conceal enriched uranium, as reported by Israeli state structures. Accordingly, it is not unlikely that after some time, Iran may resume the development of its nuclear program. This fact leads us to think that the Iranian nuclear program will remain an existential threat for Israel, which significantly increases the likelihood of a new war with Iran. It is reasonable to assume that the Iranian authorities are well aware of this and, with high probability, the decision to form a new defense council also serves to better prepare for a future military conflict. Therefore, it can be stated with near certainty that the Iranian authorities, together with their military and security elite, are preparing for a new war with Israel, making another military conflict only a matter of time.