We need to return to the past for a moment and recall a familiar history. History is needed precisely so that we can draw lessons from it; it should not remain merely a legend or a past that does not concern us.
In the mid-sixth century, the Kingdom of Lazica found itself at the center of a confrontation between two great empires – the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and Sasanian Iran. In the conflict between Byzantium and Persia, Lazica fought on the side of the Romans. The treacherous betrayal of Byzantine commanders led to the death of King Gubazi of Lazica. The future foreign policy orientation of the Georgian kingdom had to be decided, and for this reason, in 555, the political elite of Lazica convened, holding an assembly that entered history as the “Assembly of Egrisi.”
One part of Lazican politicians supported breaking relations with Byzantium and allying with Iran, while the other part, despite the betrayal of the Byzantine commanders, continued to support the Eastern Roman Empire. The two camps were represented by well-known politicians and rhetoricians of the time Aiete and Phartadzi.
Aietes argued that “the ancient dignity of the Colchians has vanished, henceforth we can no longer rule over others … If we leave this wrongdoing without attention, the Romans will no longer spare us and will humiliate us even more thanks to our inaction. Of course, the Romans treat more arrogantly those who submit, and they usually look down from above on those who serve them … I want the Kingdom of Colchis to have its former greatness, to need no foreign help from outside, and to rely on its own strength both in war and in peace. But when, due to the circumstances of the times or the perversity of fate, or because of both, we have weakened so much that we have become subordinate to others, it is still better to be subordinate to the one who is more benevolent, who inviolably preserves goodwill toward his own people and allies.” (Do you not find parallels with today’s “Georgian Dream” reality?)
Phartadzi emphasized the unity of values and Christian identity with Byzantium and said that “the Romans are nevertheless more acceptable, because the Persians will never reconcile themselves to the fact that we have a different faith. We should not follow despair and emotional turmoil, nor flee like slaves; rather, we must be imbued with the desire for Colchian freedom, endure misfortune courageously, and commit no unworthy act that would defile ancestral customs. Let us inform the emperor of what has happened and see what response we receive; if our just demand is rejected, only then should we think about an alliance with the Persians.”
Ultimately, Phartadzi’s view prevailed.
Throughout history, the question of Georgia’s foreign policy orientation has resembled the Assembly of Egrisi. Georgia has always had to maneuver between great civilizations to preserve its freedom and its own identity.
Even when the great powers of the East offered Georgian kings comfort, prosperity, and personal glory in exchange for freedom, Georgian rulers chose the space of European civilization. It is no coincidence that in the eighteenth century, when Vakhtang VI appointed by the Persian Empire as the ruler of Eastern Georgia and effectively acting as a governor established a printing press, he first printed the New Testament and The Knight in the Panther’s Skin for Georgians. If anything defined Georgian identity, it was precisely The Knight in the Panther’s Skin and Christian philosophy. Vakhtang VI attempted to restore lost or forgotten identities and consciousness to his contemporaries, who had been alienated from their true essence by historical geopolitical changes.
Georgia has always stood before a foreign policy choice and has always chosen the space of Greek democracy, Roman law, and Christian morality which is Europe and, more broadly, Western civilization.
Governments will change in Western countries; political forces whose foreign policy priorities differ from Georgia’s interests will periodically come to power. It may also happen that Western states disagree with one another on various issues, that cracks appear in their relations, and that the West fails to demonstrate unity and solidarity. Nevertheless, Georgia’s best choice is integration into Western structures to ensure national security, national identity, and economic well-being. Therefore, Georgia’s Western choice can be called an existential choice – one necessary for survival.
Georgia stands before this choice today as well. Georgia cannot alter its geographic position. It is located in a historical geopolitical triangle between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. All three are old historical powers with constant revisionist aspirations. Changing this rigid geopolitical reality takes time; Tbilisi will have to function in this environment for a long time, with an uncertain future, without security guarantees and without prospects for economic growth. Pragmatically, integration into Western economic and security structures is Georgia’s only way out.
But one thing is what choice Georgia has, and another is how feasible it is to implement it in practice. International politics is, in most cases, a two-way street. What interest might Europe and the United States have in Georgia?
Europe and the United States are a space of values. Freedom, democracy, the free market, human rights, and the rule of law are the values that the West not only supports but also on which it builds partnerships with states that share the same principles. Some adherents of political realism may disagree, but precisely according to realism, supporting countries with shared values is a national interest in the international system for the purpose of increasing relative power.
Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine was a kind of wake-up call for Europe. The European Union, in a state of so-called “enlargement fatigue,” was not thinking about future expansion; the countries of the Western Balkans, purely due to geography, were in a better position than the countries of the Eastern Partnership program. This program itself was merely a “consolation prize” for countries that were passengers at a station where the enlargement train would never arrive. Russia’s attempt to forcibly change borders and erase Ukraine from the map after the Second World War awakened Europe, which made geopolitical decisions by granting Georgia candidate status and starting accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. Today, Georgia’s de facto government has already become a headache for the European Union, because it benefits from candidate country status. If anything is disadvantageous for the European Union, if anything damages its reputation, if anything would be a heavy blow to the next enlargement, it is the EU’s “failure” with any candidate country. Georgia can use this moment to its own advantage, as a kind of leverage in the positive sense of the word.
Nowhere does the EU flag fly as high as in Tbilisi during protest rallies against Ivanishvili’s authoritarian regime. Enlargement gives a new impulse to the European integration project, strengthens the idea of European identity, awakens the dormant concept of European unity, provides an exit for the stalled European project, and completes the process of European integration that turns Europe into a geopolitical actor. It is no coincidence that Germany’s former state secretary has repeatedly said that Tbilisi today is Europe’s true capital.
Europe does not live in the realities of the Cold War; the world has changed over the past 30 years. It is difficult to imagine Europe’s security without the security of the Black Sea region. Therefore, it is necessary that EU enlargement be accompanied by a security component. Russia’s full-scale military aggression in Ukraine has confirmed this and reminded European capitals of real threats. The geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region still seems to require deeper understanding in the West. The accession of Ukraine and Georgia to European and Euro-Atlantic structures would turn the Black Sea into a “Western lake,” permanently burying Russia’s ambition to become the “Third Rome” and to gain access to “warm waters.” The Black Sea region is as essential to Western security as the balance of power in the Arctic region, which has recently become more prominent on the international agenda.
The fact that the Russian Federation and Iran are under international sanctions—which may last for a long time, even without assuming worse scenarios (the continuation of the war in Ukraine, another war in the wider region) implies the need for the West to diversify trade and economic communications. Despite many challenges facing the states participating in the potential “Middle Corridor” project (high costs, lack of appropriate infrastructure, the need to modernize existing infrastructure, long-standing disputes among some states around the Caspian Sea, the development of tariff policy, and others), the Middle Corridor project nevertheless remains an expensive but the best option for the West in terms of trade communication with Central Asia and Indo-China and the transportation of energy resources. The exit of Russia and/or Iran from international isolation does not guarantee that Moscow and/or Tehran will abandon revisionist aspirations in the future and become partners of the West.
Crisis also creates opportunities. Pragmatism, rationality, and a certain degree of moral clarity should drive Georgia’s foreign policy, which in turn must be defined solely by the country’s long-term national interests in changing international circumstances. Georgia has only the right to disappointment, the kind of disappointment we have experienced in the past, when we were left outside the League of Nations, then without hesitation Georgia was handed over to Stalin; later, when all of Eastern Europe was easily left to Russia to be torn apart; when the advance of the “ally” Stalin’s army toward European capitals was not stopped; when after the Second World War “Uncle Joe” (as they affectionately called the greatest serial killer in human history) was handed over citizens of the Russian Empire who had taken refuge in the West and who faced certain death in the USSR; the disappointment we felt when Russia’s aggression in August 2008 was allowed, and afterward when the world turned a blind eye to the fact that for the first time since the Second World War one state violated another state’s territorial integrity and borders so crudely; it hurt when some Western politicians tried to normalize relations with the executioner at the expense of the victim, or when just months after the war Russia was offered the reset button; we were disappointed when partners asked Tbilisi to lift Georgia’s veto on Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization; we were disappointed by the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea and Donbas in 2014, and by the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 projects that increased dependence on Russian gas; we were disappointed by the West’s response to human rights violations by the Ivanishvili regime in Georgia, to the erosion of justice and ultimately the capture of the state, to the repression of media and political parties; we were astonished and driven to despair by the West’s naïveté and, diplomatically speaking, excessive optimism toward Russia and Ivanishvili, but we have never felt anger, because we have no other choice.
We always have Phartadzi’s choice.
Disclaimer:
This text is an edited version of an article originally published in Akhali Iveria.