Author: Nata Koridze, UGSPN Senior Research Fellow
Now in its fifth year, the cumulative consequences of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine are raising stakes and increasingly constraining the Kremlin’s strategic options. Although Russia has shown military adaptability and political and economic resilience beyond what was expected in the early stages of the war, the conflict has evolved into a costly war of attrition that has failed to deliver the rapid strategic outcomes Moscow anticipated in 2022. The Kremlin now faces mounting military, economic, social and political pressures that complicate both the continuation of the war and any potential transition away from it.
May 9, 2026 Parade
The symbolism of Russia’s recent May 9 Victory Day parade reflected this altered strategic reality. Although traditionally intended as a demonstration of military strength and geopolitical stature, this year’s event was subdued and instead highlighted Russia’s limitations. The absence of major military hardware, only one tribune to sit spectators, instead of the usual three, the limited attendance of foreign leaders and the heightened security measures implemented in response to possible Ukrainian drone attacks all suggested that Russia is operating under sustained wartime pressure and international isolation, rather than projecting uncontested confidence. Notably, North Korean soldiers marched in the parade for the first time. Equally significant was the prominence given to veterans of the ‘special military operation’, or “SVO” as it is known in Russia.
Elevating veterans from the war in Ukraine to the symbolic status traditionally reserved for veterans of the Soviet victory in the Second World War was particularly controversial. Critics viewed this as a deliberate attempt to equate Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with the Soviet Union’s existential struggle against Nazi Germany – an analogy that has become central to the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda.
The frontline
Following the initial invasion’s failures, Russian forces reorganized their mobilization systems, expanded defense production (including drones), modified their tactics and sustained offensive operations across multiple sectors. These adjustments demonstrate that Russia is neither militarily exhausted nor incapable of continuing the war. However, military adaptation should not be mistaken for strategic success. Russian territorial advances have remained limited and have often been achieved at an extraordinary human and material cost without fundamentally altering the strategic balance. The Russian Ministry of Defense is struggling to recruit enough personnel to compensate for losses. The Russian recruitment rate has fallen below the level required for replacement, with only 70,500 military service contracts concluded in the first quarter of 2026 – below the monthly quota of 33,500–34,600 contracts. Moscow has failed to achieve the rapid political collapse of Ukrainian resistance that was probably assumed initially. Ukraine remains politically intact, militarily resilient and supported by the international community.
It has become increasingly evident in the fifth year of the war that Ukraine has achieved and important advantage in military innovation. The rapid expansion of Ukrainian drone warfare has altered battlefield dynamics. This has increasingly threatened Russian rear infrastructure. Ukrainian strikes have reached military facilities, logistics hubs, refineries, airfields and oil infrastructure deep inside Russian territory. By early spring, for the first time since the war began, it had surpassed Russia in the number of long-range UAV launches. Military analysts are increasingly emphasizing the strategic importance of Ukraine’s advances in unmanned systems, particularly in low-altitude operational zones, which are critical for reconnaissance and strike coordination. This was largely facilitated by financial aid from Western allies. Military analysts note that Ukrainians have achieved a widening of the so-called ‘grey zone’ between the combatants, thereby denying the enemy the ability to capture new territories despite their numerical superiority. Should Ukraine further consolidate these capabilities, Russian battlefield effectiveness could face more serious constraints, a concern now being voiced by Z-bloggers and Russian military analysts alike.
The impressive technological and operational advances of Ukrainians are being noted and admitted even by the U.S. military leaders. As United States secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll said: “Ukraine’s Delta common operating system, their modular open system architecture, command and control system is absolutely incredible. It fully integrates every single drone, every censoring, very shooting platform into just one simple network. Ours does not.”
Noting that the Russians are “losing five times as many soldiers a month as the Ukrainians are”, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said: “There is no doubt that the necessity of fighting this work has caused the Ukrainians to develop new tactics, new technics, new equipment new technology that is creating a sort of hybrid asymmetrical warfare, that’s impressive, no doubt about it.” He called the Ukrainians armed forces “the strongest, most powerful armed forces in Europe right now.”
War Fatigue and Public Discontent
The military dimension also has political implications. The Kremlin’s legitimacy has long depended on projecting an image of competence, control and strategic effectiveness. A prolonged war without a clear or convincing end goal gradually undermines this image, especially as the realities of the conflict become more apparent to and experienced by Russian society. Currently, there seems to be no clear vision in Russia of what the war’s objectives are today and what “victory” would look like.
Although there has been no widespread anti-war mobilization, signs of fatigue and frustration of the general public are becoming increasingly visible. There are daily posts by ordinary citizens expressing dissatisfaction with the existing situation, the so-called Z-bloggers also have started voicing concerns regarding the way war goes. In authoritarian systems, however, dissatisfaction does not automatically translate into political instability, particularly when coercive institutions remain strong. Nevertheless, prolonged war generates cumulative social pressures that can erode passive compliance over time.
Russian citizens are increasingly facing the practical burdens of wartime governance. Inflation, elevated borrowing costs, communication disruptions, rising food prices, restrictions on digital platforms, deteriorating public services in some regions and, lately, growing exposure to military drone attacks have made the conflict harder to perceive as distant. Public frustration appears to be driven less by ideological objections than by tangible disruptions to daily life and growing doubts about state preparedness. The most significant impact was felt by Russians when Ukrainian drones hit Moscow and the surrounding area at the beginning of May, with many Russians posting footage of the attacks online.
For much of Vladimir Putin’s time in power, political stability had been based on an unwritten ‘social contract’, whereby relative prosperity and predictability were exchanged for public disengagement from politics. The arrangement was ruined by the extended wartime.
Questions also surround the durability of official narratives. Questions also surround the durability of official narratives. Although state-controlled media remains influential, fewer and fewer people are watching state TV to get news. There are stark contradictions between official claims and observable realities, which seem to be gradually undermining public trust, particularly when military progress fails to match propagandistic rhetoric that has remained largely unchanged for the past four and a half years. According to official polls conducted by VCIOM, Putin’s approval ratings have fallen to a record low. Among elite circles, overt dissent remains limited, largely due to the highly personalized and coercive nature of the Russian political system. Nevertheless, the Russian elite is not homogeneous. Certain sectors, especially those linked to defense, security and wartime industrial production have benefited materially or politically from the war. Others have faced sanctions, financial losses, reputational damage, property seizures, legal prosecution and travel restrictions.
Part of pro-Kremlin bloggers and TV figures are criticizing the judgement and decision-making regarding the war strategy and tactics. They refrain from mentioning Putin’s name in this context; however, it is only a matter of time before his name is linked to the war’s failure. The central question is whether the prolonged conflict will gradually alter assumptions about the long-term value of continued loyalty to the existing political order. In these circumstances, even subtle rhetorical shifts may be analytically significant, particularly in a system where political language is tightly controlled.
It also appears that Russian political rhetoric towards Ukraine, its military and its president has evolved. Initially, wartime discourse was characterized by the overt dismissal of the Ukrainian leadership and the assumption of a swift victory. More recently, however, the official tone has become more measured, with many Russian commentators openly acknowledging the professionalism and adaptability of the Ukrainian forces, something that would previously have been politically unacceptable. Another significant indicator of this change is Putin’s own evolving rhetoric. In the early stages of the war, the Kremlin’s language towards the Ukrainian leadership was openly contemptuous and dehumanizing. Putin and other senior Russian figures frequently used dismissive or insulting language towards President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, calling him “clown”, “drug-addict”, and “terrorist.”
In contrast, adopting a more formal tone, such as referring to Zelenskyy as ‘Mr. Zelenskyy’ and publicly acknowledging the possibility of negotiations, would suggest a change in rhetoric.
Intensified Repression
Domestic political control remains strong, but increasingly reliant on coercive instruments. Since the full-scale invasion, political repression has intensified substantially. Independent media outlets have been marginalized or forced into exile, anti-war speech has been criminalized and administrative pressure against dissent has increased. Thousands of Russian citizens who have voiced opposition to the war have received harsh sentences and several political prisoners have died in prison.
This reflects both the strength of the regime and its structural vulnerability. The Russian state retains a robust coercive capacity and is fully capable of suppressing organized opposition. However, a growing reliance on repression may indicate a decline in confidence in less coercive means of maintaining political legitimacy.
In May 2026 the Russian Public Opinion Research Center All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM) has changed the way it conducts its weekly polls after its April polls showed the decline in approval ratings for Vladimir Putin (from April 13 to 19, Putin’s approval rating fell to its lowest level since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine to 65.6%, while his trust rating stood at 71%). The change is apparently conducted to gauge the approval ratings of the president, the government, and political parties. Thus, whereas previously people were surveyed only by telephone, starting in May, so-called “door-to-door visits” have been added to the telephone interviews. After the change, the Center said, Putin’s ratings started to grow again.
Meanwhile, the reports have surfaced in the press citing leaks from the power vertical that Putin fears an assassination attempt in a coup.
“SVO” Veterans Factor
Another long-term concern is the social consequences of militarization. A large number of veterans will eventually need to be reintegrated into civilian life, which will create challenges associated with trauma, violence and social dislocation. The practice of atoning for crimes by enlisting in the army perpetuates the cycle of individuals (sometimes already convicted) going to war, returning, committing a crime, and then going back again. Reports of criminal incidents involving returning fighters are raising legitimate concerns. Since the start of hostilities in Ukraine, courts have handed down at least 8,000 convictions against combatants, and the number of victims of serious crimes (murders and cases of grievous bodily harm) committed by returning servicemen has exceeded 1,000. On the other hand, there are also reports that the returning veterans are denied jobs, harassed or attacked, having difficulty integrating into society.
War Dependent Economy
Russia has proven to be more economically resilient than many early forecasts suggested. A combination of fiscal intervention, redirected trade, monetary controls and increased defense spending has enabled macroeconomic stabilization, despite sanctions and international isolation. However, this resilience should not be confused with long-term structural health. The economy is now facing severe overheating, high inflation, and a labor shortage. The Russian economy has become increasingly dependent on war-related expenditure, state intervention and defense-sector production. While military spending can stimulate short-term output, employment and industrial activity, this does not constitute sustainable modernization or diversified economic growth.
Significant structural constraints are becoming increasingly apparent. Significant labor shortages driven by demographic pressures, mobilization, emigration, and defense-sector absorption have emerged as a serious economic challenge. Inflation and elevated borrowing costs are making macroeconomic management more difficult, and businesses outside defense-related sectors are facing mounting difficulties.
Russia’s economic growth remained at around 4 percent in both 2022 and 2023, before plunging to approximately 1 percent in 2024 and 2025. Growth then turned negative in the first quarter of this year. While official inflation is running at around 6 percent, the actual rate is probably in double digits for most Russians. High interest rates have squeezed out business investment, particularly in non-military sectors.
Russia and the World
Russia’s international standing and image have been significantly damaged by its aggression against Ukraine. It is isolated from Western countries and has lost lucrative markets. The South Caucasus, the Western Balkans, Middle East, or Africa – Russia political clout is damaged in all these regions. Embroiled in the war in Ukraine, Moscow does not have the resources to support its traditional allies, such as Syria, Venezuela and Iran. As for its ally China, Putin’s 25th official visit to the country on 20 May demonstrated that Russia’s main objective, the finalization of the Power of Siberia-2 natural gas project, has not been achieved. According to Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov, only a ‘general understanding’ has been reached, and no tangible progress has been made towards realizing the project. Russia has been promoting the project for several years now, especially since its invasion in Ukraine its economy has become more dependent on China. If completed, the pipeline would transport up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas to China annually.
Sanctions Effect
In response to massive international sanctions, Russia has adopted alternative financial arrangements, redirected trade, encouraged import substitution and engaged more deeply with non-Western partners economically. However, this has come at a substantial cost and the damage to Russian economy due to the sanctions is now evident. Transaction expenses have increased, technological access has narrowed, trade logistics have become more complex and economic flexibility has diminished. Restrictions on advanced technologies and export controls continue to cause friction, particularly in sectors that rely on foreign inputs. Russia downgraded its economic growth forecast for 2026 to 0.4%. While Russia remains economically functional, it does so under more constrained and less efficient conditions.
Energy
Energy revenues remain essential for sustaining the war economy for Russia. Moscow has maintained significant oil export capacity by redirecting sales towards Asian markets and increasingly relying on opaque shipping networks and sanctions-evasion mechanisms. While these arrangements have prevented a catastrophic collapse in revenue, they come with operational inefficiencies, steep discounts, legal uncertainty and growing enforcement risks. Russia recently benefited from an increase in the oil price due to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, but these benefits have been limited by Ukraine’s successful strikes on Russian oil refineries and other oil-related infrastructure.
One of the most strategically significant long-term economic consequences of Russia’s war may be the long-term loss of Europe as a premium energy market and the long-term general deterioration of Russia’s economic and demographic situation.
Conclusion
These pressures do not suggest an imminent collapse of the regime or immediate political instability. At the same time, triumphalist narratives of Russian strategic success are outdated and misleading. War has now produced an increasingly constrained strategic environment, where every major policy path carries significant costs.
One possible outcome is the eventual de-escalation or some form of negotiated stabilization, driven by accumulating military and economic pressures. However, ending or substantially reducing the war would create its own domestic risks, including blame allocation among the elite, economic transition shocks, scrutiny of wartime costs and the complex reintegration of returning fighters.
The alternative is continued conflict. For the Kremlin, prolonged war may appear to be a safer political option than facing the uncertainties of post-war adjustment. Wartime conditions justify exceptional governance, sustain nationalist mobilization and defer political accountability. Nevertheless, continued conflict carries its own dangers, including deeper economic distortion, prolonged military attrition, further social militarization and mounting institutional strain.
The Kremlin therefore faces a strategic dilemma. The central issue is not a lack of options, but that the associated costs have increased substantially. Russia could continue the war for the foreseeable future. However, the longer the conflict persists, the less room the Kremlin has for maneuver against the backdrop of unachieved strategic objectives of the war, war-dependent and shrinking economy, a large number of disillusioned men returning from the front and overall worsening of the standard of living.