This research analyzes contemporary trends of radicalization within Georgia, with a specific focus on the
young adult demographic. Central to this study is the deconstruction of mobilization strategies employed by the radical right, understanding their appeal among young supporters, and illuminating the motivations behind their engagement with various radical-right discourses and groups. Additionally, the analysis unpacks the commonly attributed “pro-Russian” label associated with the Georgian far right and explain the nuances of this association.

"If the political ends are vague or unspecified, how can you choose methods and means that are fit for purpose" - Colin Gray

Author: Shalva Dzebisashvili

Abstract

Since the Bucharest summit declaration that promised the NATO-membership to Ukraine and Georgia, the option of the membership action plan (MAP) - formally the only mechanism for joining the alliance - became increasingly controversial, politicized and questionable, putting the credibility of the Alliance and its promises under the big question mark. The article doubles down on the debatable value of the MAP from the perspective of military deterrence and argues that the current version of the membership action plan does nothing whatsoever to increase the deterrent of a membership candidate, and in contrary, may lead to a much higher probability of military threat, i.e. aggression. Hence, the MAP appears to acquire a purely formal nature, with no practical applicability and military value to secure the membership process itself. Realizing this but not admitting it openly, the alliance is therefore trapped in its hesitance to decide on membership, thus effectively "donating" the veto right to a revisionist country that actively opposes the enlargement policy. The rapid inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO without formally activating the MAP-procedure, is reviewed as the vivid demonstration and testimony of the accuracy of arguments provided in the article.

Megi Benia

Executive Summary

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has proven unsuccessful in many unexpected directions and the disinformation campaign with the aim of spreading the false narratives about its military engagement in Ukraine is among them. A general overview of respective events and moves has shown that Russia has been forced to adjust its approach on disinformation and increase its focus on the domestic audience. The article aims to demonstrate that in these efforts, Russia tries:

1. To justify its so-called “special military operation” by claiming to seek liberation of the brotherly Ukrainian people from forcefully installed neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv;
2. To apply the policy of deniability to the crimes it has committed on the territory of Ukraine.

At the international level, Russia attempts:

1. To portray Ukraine as a West-supported aggressor by using the traditional playbook of illegal development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on the territories of the former Soviet Union;
2. To distract Western societies’ support for weapons supply to Ukraine by warning of nuclear use;
3. To prevent the full international isolation by targeting the countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America to get their support at the different international fora.

After providing specific facts that support the existence of these patterns, the article tries to explain the reasons behind Russia’s changed behaviours and claims that it was caused by:

1. The unexpected failure on the battlefield in Ukraine;
2. The development of the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT):
3. The fear of complete international isolation.

Revaz Chkheidze

Executive Summary

Over the years, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has evolved with challenges. At the same time, the scope of CSDP was gradually expanding, which required closer work with partners. New challenges were reflected in the EU Global Security Strategy adopted in 2016, which further highlighted the issue of the EU's strategic autonomy in the international arena.

In the wake of other fundamental documents, in 2022 the European Union developed a "Strategic Compass", which was given additional burdens by the Russia-Ukraine war. In fact, for the first time, it clearly defines the measures of the future defense and security policy of the European Union. The European Peace Facility (EPF) was established as another important, but this time, financial mechanism for the implementation of the security and defense policy, which is actively used in the context of the aid allocated to Ukraine by the European Union.

The involvement of third countries in the common foreign and security policy of the European Union is supported by the relevant mechanisms, which also underwent a considerable evolution, which was accelerated by the process of adequately re-evaluating the international relations situation on the part of the European Union.

As a result of Russia's full-scale military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, the EU completely changed its approaches and cautious attitude in terms of assistance to the military component of Ukraine, which was caused by Russia's rude and brazen crossing of red lines in international relations that existed even before the war.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the financial aid allocated by the European Union to Ukraine for military purposes amounted to 3.1 billion euros, in addition to bilateral aid. Along with this, the Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine (EUMAM) was launched, within the framework of which up to 15,000 soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be trained mainly in Poland, as well as in Germany. Overall, it is the first time, the EU directly provides military aid to a third country.

Gela Merabishvili

Executive Summary

Hungary stands out from other Eastern and Central European states in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War. While Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have provided plenty of political and military support to Ukraine and significantly reduced economic ties with Russia, Hungary’s Fidesz-led government has tried to maintain trade and diplomacy with Moscow while showing only tepid solidarity with Ukraine. This article explains the reasons behind Hungary’s particular position by analyzing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s discourse.

By categorizing Orbán’s discourse into local, national and global geographical scales, the article identifies three main factors shaping the Hungarian response to the war:

1. The distrust between Hungary and Ukraine derives from the several years of politicization of the Hungarian transborder community in Ukraine’s westernmost region of Transcarpathia.
2. Hungary’s reliance on the Russian oil and gas led to Orbán’s decision to stick with Russia as an economic partner. Simultaneously, the April 2022 election period encouraged his populist narrative, prioritising Hungary’s economic needs over solidarity with Ukraine.
3. Orbán’s long-existing geopolitical vision of a multipolar world led him to view the Russian-Ukrainian War as a materialization of the great power rivalry between the US and Russia, where each seeks to expand its zone of influence. This geopolitical view then justifies Hungary’s neutral role. Orbán reframes Hungary’s neutrality in the discourse of peace versus war, whereby Hungary represents an “island of peace” and himself ­– a promoter of peace. At the same time, the great powers and their local proxies are only interested in continuing the war.