Author: Nikoloz Kavtaradze

Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia has pursued the strategic objective of reestablishing itself as a major global actor, evoking the Soviet Union's historical influence. This ambition reflects a broader goal of challenging Western hegemony and positioning Russia as a pivotal player within an emerging multipolar world order. To achieve these ends, the Kremlin has initiated a comprehensive campaign against Western liberal democracy. Central to this strategy is the promotion of authoritarianism as a superior model to democracy, the consolidation of formal and informal alliances among authoritarian, non-democratic, and semi-democratic states, and the systematic disruption of the international order founded on the principles of rule-based governance.

Given the Russian Federation's constrained military and material resources for direct confrontation with the West, it has chosen to conduct its declared war in the so-called "grey zone," operating below the threshold that would trigger significant international responses to its hostile and illegal actions. This style of battle, known as hybrid warfare in Western cultures, came under increased focus after Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022,  prompting the West to respond more appropriately. This reaction was reasonable, given that the goals of Russian hybrid warfare were to weaken Western strategic alliances, undermine liberal democracy, and exert decisive influence over the rules-based international order and global political systems in order to advance its own strategic interests.

UGSPN Annual Report 2024

The Georgian Elections Observatory (#GEObservatory24) is a short-term initiative focused on fact-checking pre-election narratives in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections on October 26. Unlike traditional fact-checking platforms, this project goes beyond verifying individual claims by analyzing entire narratives. It combines political analysis with fact-checking and media analysis to provide a comprehensive understanding of the pre-election discourse. The project is supported by the Fojo Swedish Media Institute in collaboration with the Investigative Media Lab (IML) and the UG Security, Policy, and Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN).

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in these stories do not necessarily reflect those of the listed organizations.

As Georgia increasingly struggles to comply with its Europe- an commitments and, simultaneously, Russia intensifies its in- formation campaign (disinformation and propaganda) within Georgia, the question of whether Georgia’s political system and institutions are resilient enough to counter this threat be- comes more relevant than ever before. Therefore, this research project applies a new assessment model (R/VAT) of national resilience to analyze the resilience capacity (vulnerability) of the political system (domain) and its major actors against the threat of proliferation of malign Russian narratives, thereby generating the annual political resilience index (PRI), which can also be applied in other national contexts.

This research analyzes contemporary trends of radicalization within Georgia, with a specific focus on the
young adult demographic. Central to this study is the deconstruction of mobilization strategies employed by the radical right, understanding their appeal among young supporters, and illuminating the motivations behind their engagement with various radical-right discourses and groups. Additionally, the analysis unpacks the commonly attributed “pro-Russian” label associated with the Georgian far right and explain the nuances of this association.

While the Georgian radical right has been narratively labeled as pro-Russian almost since its widespread resurgence in recent years, this designation is still in need of deconstruction. Association with Russia is a multidimensional process, varying from value association to practical links and financial networks. While all of it could be considered contributive to the destruction of liberal democracy, the nuanced understanding of “pro-Russianness” within Georgia’s radical right is salient at least for the following reasons: it assists in identifying the core of the challenge and focusing solution-oriented discussion on the matter; moreover, it reflects on the indirect ways of influencing the youth’s ideological inclinations and positions on democratic values; and finally, it contributes to tailoring policy suggestions to the nuances of the issue. 

"If the political ends are vague or unspecified, how can you choose methods and means that are fit for purpose" - Colin Gray

Author: Shalva Dzebisashvili

Abstract

Since the Bucharest summit declaration that promised the NATO-membership to Ukraine and Georgia, the option of the membership action plan (MAP) - formally the only mechanism for joining the alliance - became increasingly controversial, politicized and questionable, putting the credibility of the Alliance and its promises under the big question mark. The article doubles down on the debatable value of the MAP from the perspective of military deterrence and argues that the current version of the membership action plan does nothing whatsoever to increase the deterrent of a membership candidate, and in contrary, may lead to a much higher probability of military threat, i.e. aggression. Hence, the MAP appears to acquire a purely formal nature, with no practical applicability and military value to secure the membership process itself. Realizing this but not admitting it openly, the alliance is therefore trapped in its hesitance to decide on membership, thus effectively "donating" the veto right to a revisionist country that actively opposes the enlargement policy. The rapid inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO without formally activating the MAP-procedure, is reviewed as the vivid demonstration and testimony of the accuracy of arguments provided in the article.

Author: Irakli Javakhishvili

Abstract

The project of the “Middle Corridor” which is a component of China’s “grand strategy”, is an important instrument of Beijing’s Westpolitik. Georgia, in turn, has a significant place in this project, due to its favorable geopolitical location.Through the regions of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, China will create various land connections with the European Union, which will also serve as an alternative to the Russian route. This will be the shortest way from China to Romania – the “Middle Corridor”, which will pass through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea. In the same sense, the Anaklia deep-water port can become an essential node in the functioning of the Corridor, especially if its construction is carried out by a Chinese company (it will have not only an economic, but also a significant political weight). However, regardless of the possible economic benefits that Georgia may receive from the “Middle Corridor” project, including through the Anaklia port, such a shift in foreign policy priorities of Tbilisi may cause irreparable damage to the country’s aspirations to join the EU and, in general, completely alienate it from the Western democratic world. At the same time, the benefits of the Middle Corridor project will be much greater for China (in proportionality) than for Georgia, particularly in the light of the fact that Beijing often shows dishonesty in bilateral agreements and partnerships, and often applies economic and political leverage to the contracting party.

The report reviews the current situation in the areas of Georgia’s defense and security policy planning, provides a comprehensive analysis of the main problems in these areas, taking into account both internal and external factors, and offers insights and recommendations on these issues to address shortcomings, including in the form of an optimal defense model.

Abstract

In 2024, the U.S. officials and government agencies openly accused China of conducting dangerous cyber operations against the country’s critical infrastructure (CI). The U.S. military and intelligence agencies believe that China’s cyber activities can distract the U.S. ability “to project, or defend against, military action”. By initiating cyber-attacks against and preposition malware in U.S. CI facilities in close proximity of the U.S. military bases, China might be preparing for several possible scenarios, including an unexpected cyber-attack against the U.S. critical military infrastructure, which might amount to the scales of the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941. If successful, current cyber activities conducted in peacetime can disrupt the U.S. ability to properly perform its military functions during the war or crisis.

Vasil Glonti

Executive Summary
After the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Iran became very active in the foreign political arena. The political and military elite of this country considered that the mentioned conflict would change the geopolitical configuration of the world, so Iran would need strategic visions and an action plan adapted to the new reality. In its foreign policy, the regime of the Iranian Mullahs identified as the main priorities: activation and expansion of cooperation with Russia, especially in the military-industrial, economic and banking-financial fields; further development of Iran's nuclear program; arranging relations with the countries of the Middle East region and giving priority to the regional security format; strengthening political-economic and military expansion in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon; deepening of confrontation with the USA and Israel in the Middle East and different regions of the world; pursuing an aggressive policy towards Azerbaijan and neutralizing the influence of Israel; expansion of strategic relations with Armenia;

Megi Benia

Executive Summary

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has proven unsuccessful in many unexpected directions and the disinformation campaign with the aim of spreading the false narratives about its military engagement in Ukraine is among them. A general overview of respective events and moves has shown that Russia has been forced to adjust its approach on disinformation and increase its focus on the domestic audience. The article aims to demonstrate that in these efforts, Russia tries:

1. To justify its so-called “special military operation” by claiming to seek liberation of the brotherly Ukrainian people from forcefully installed neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv;
2. To apply the policy of deniability to the crimes it has committed on the territory of Ukraine.

At the international level, Russia attempts:

1. To portray Ukraine as a West-supported aggressor by using the traditional playbook of illegal development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on the territories of the former Soviet Union;
2. To distract Western societies’ support for weapons supply to Ukraine by warning of nuclear use;
3. To prevent the full international isolation by targeting the countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America to get their support at the different international fora.

After providing specific facts that support the existence of these patterns, the article tries to explain the reasons behind Russia’s changed behaviours and claims that it was caused by:

1. The unexpected failure on the battlefield in Ukraine;
2. The development of the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT):
3. The fear of complete international isolation.